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THIRD PARTY STANDING
Henry P. Monaghan*
Traditional constitutional theory posits a narrow conception of the issues
that a litigant properly may assert. A litigant may invoke only his own
constitutional rights or immunities; he may challenge a statute only in the
terms in which it is applied to him; and, in the application process, courts have
broad power to construe the relevant statutory language so as to avoid consti-
tutional difficulties.' The Yazoo case2 is perhaps the best known- example of
judicial adherence to these canons. There, a railroad claimed that a statute
mandating speedy settlement of "all claims for lost or damaged freight"
contravened the fourteenth amendment. The railroad urged that, whatever the
evidence in the case at bar, the general language of the statute penalized even
the failure to settle unjustifiable claims. Thus, the railroad contended, the
statute brought within its terms constitutionally privileged conduct. But, said
the Court,
it is not open to the railway company to complain on that score. It
has not been penalized for failing to accede to an excessive or
extravagant claim, but for failing to make reasonably prompt settle-
ment of a claim which upon due inquiry has been pronounced just in
every respect. Of course, the argument to sustain the contention is
that, if the statute embraces cases such as are supposed, it is void as
to them, and, if so void, is void in toto. But this court must deal
with the case in hand, and not with imaginary ones. It suffices,
therefore, to hold that, as applied to cases like the present, the
statute is valid. How the state court may apply it to other cases,
whether its general words may be treated as more or less restrained,
and how far parts of it may be sustained if others fail, are matters
upon which we need not speculate now.3
* Thomas M. Macioce Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1955, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst; LL.B. 1958, Yale University; LL.M. 1960, Harvard University. I ex-
press my thanks to numerous colleagues at Columbia for their help, and here (as elsewhere) to two
splendid lawyers who will always be colleagues: Dan MacLeod and William Ryckman. Most
especially, I owe a great debt to George Skelly, who saved me from many errors, obvious and not
so obvious.
1. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1960), contains the most elaborate modern
statement of these principles. See also, e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55
(1979).
2. Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912).
3. Id. at 219-20.
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Developments in the last three decades have substantially eroded, if not
completely decentered, the Yazoo model. Increasingly, litigants whose own
activities are assumed to fall within a statute's valid applications are permitted
to assert the statute's potentially invalid applications with respect to persons
not before the court. The first amendment overbreadth cases are a familiar
example. 4 So too are the jus tertii standing cases, in which litigants related to
third parties in certain ways are permitted to raise the latter's rights.5 Few
judges or commentators seem inclined to scrutinize the premises of this ex-
panding "third party standing": 6 So long as he suffers an injury in fact that is
both fairly traceable to the challenged statute and likely to be redressable by a
favorable judgment, the litigant has standing in the constitutional sense.7
Once these requisites are established, it is assumed that the scope of the issues
open to a litigant is simply a matter of remedial detail and, as such, governed
by sound judicial discretion. 8 In sum, the Yazoo doctrine appears not only to
be in eclipse, but, more significantly, to lack any important intellectual center
of gravity.
But reducing third party standing to discretionary rules of judicial prac-
tice is very troubling. Serious problems of legitimacy are raised when the
principles governing the power of courts to pass on the constitutionality of
statutes are subject to unanalyzed and ungrounded notions of judicial "discre-
4. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970). For
a briefer discussion, see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-24 (1978).
5. In differentiating jus tertii from overbreadth standing commentators have emphasized the
relationship between the litigant and the third party right holders. In a jus tertii case, the litigant
has a preexisting relationship with "real" third parties whose interests are implicated; in an
overbreadth case, the litigant is permitted to raise the rights of "hypothetical" third persons. P.
Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 191 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler]; Note, Standing to Assert
Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 438-44 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Note].
6. This term has begun to take hold in the case law and academic commentary as a synonym
for jus tertii standing. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 492 n.4 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). See generally Rohr, Fighting for the Rights
of Others: The Troubled Law of Third Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U.
Miami L. Rev. 393 (1981). As the discussion in Part 1, infra, indicates, the term might be used to
include overbreadth standing as well. See also Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii
in the Supreme Court, 71 Yale L.J. 599, 612-16 (1962) (treating overbreadth as a facet of jus
tertii) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Constitutional Jus Tertii].
Use of the term "standing" to describe the scope of the issues that a litigant may raise can be
faulted. A defendant in an enforcement proceeding, or a prospective defendant who initiates a
suit for prospective relief, has standing in the constitutional sense; these litigants are threatened
with injury in fact from application of the statute. Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus
Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1308, 1315-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Sedler, Substantive Jus Tertii]. But I see no harm in retaining the traditional standing terminology
to describe both the question of who has access to the courts and the separate question of the
range of issues to be litigated.
7. E.g. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
8. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 103 S. Ct. 2979, 2982-83, 2985 (1983); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978); see also Rohr, supra note
6, at 394; Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 424-25.
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tion," however "principled" their content. What, precisely, is the source of
the posited judicial authority to permit third party standing in some cases and
to deny it in others? 9 Do the Court's decisions permitting or denying third
party standing bind Congress or the state courts? Our uncertainty about such
rudimentary questions suggests that we lack a clear conception of third party
standing.
It is inviting to view the confusion over the nature of third party standing
simply as a subset of a still deeper confusion over the fundamental nature of
constitutional adjudication. The Yazoo doctrine was not understood by the
courts that applied it as resting upon discretionary remedial considerations.
Yazoo reflected a powerful and pervasive view of the nature of constitutional
adjudication, the animating premise of which denied that courts possessed a
general commission to make pronouncements on the meaning of the Constitu-
tion or to enforce public norms. Law declaration and norm enforcement were
seen as incidental by-products of the central judicial duty: protection of
private rights.' 0 Indeed, Marbury had categorically insisted that the "province
of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."" At bottom,
this conception of the judicial role in constitutional litigation analogized
constitutional to common law adjudication.12 The resulting dominance in
constitutional law of the categories of analysis drawn from private law in turn
discouraged any judicial concern for the rights of strangers to the litigation. 13
Constitutional adjudication has, of course, evolved beyond its private
rights origins, and the common law analogy has lost much of its constraining
force.' 4 In fact, the process of constitutional adjudication now operates as one
9. Compare Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132-38 (1978) (fourth amendment rights may
only be asserted by the right holder), with Doernberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling
Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 294-97
& n. 184 (1983) (expansive conception of fourth amendment rights requires broadened standing).
Cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 52 U.S.L.W. 4155, 4159 n.12 (U.S. Jan. 24,
1984) (United States would have standing to sue for injunctive relief on federal claims but not to
assert state-law claims of third parties).
10. That subject is by now too familiar to warrant more than brief consideration here. See
generally Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1365-
68 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication]; Sunstein, Judicial Relief
and Public Tort Law (Book Review), 92 Yale L.J. 749, 758 (1983). For some elaborations on the
important history of this conception, see Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14-20 (1983).
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (emphasis added); see also id. at
162-64.
12. See supra note 10.
13. The private rights model invited us to understand the nature of constitutional adjudica-
tion through the categories of private law with its (then) heavy emphasis on concepts such as
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, etc.-Hohfeld's "fundamental legal conceptions." W.
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, and Other Legal
Essays (1919). For a brief but lucid treatment, see H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 141-55
(tent. ed. 1958). Such a conceptual apparatus encourages one to think about the "personal"
nature of the litigant's right.
14. The general disintegration of the conception that public law. could be meaningfully
understood through the prism of private law began with the emergence of the administrative state.
The perception that modern government has enormous impact on existing contract and property
1984]
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in which courts discharge a special function: declaring and enforcing public
norms. 15 So viewed, constitutional adjudication is essentially a public action,
bearing no real resemblance to common law adjudication.' Judicial protec-
tion of private rights has now become a by-product of-albeit an important
one-not the justification for constitutional adjudication. Inevitably, a public
action paradigm will generate judicial access doctrines different from and
more relaxed than those obtaining under a private rights model.17 The growing
judicial tolerance of third party standing claims can be seen as one reflection
of the new model's descriptive and normative power. It is, after all, no
surprise that judicial willingness to lower the barriers with respect to those
persons who could initiate challenges to statutes was matched by a corre-
sponding willingness to broaden the range of assertable claims.
The paradigm shift is, however, far from complete.' While the emerging
public action model is rapidly dissolving the way in which we previously
arrangements, and, moreover, is itself the source of considerable wealth, generated pressure to
increase judicial control of administrative conduct beyond what could be fairly assimilated within
the Hohfeldian framework. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, supra note 10, at
14-18. Judicial efforts to absorb and domesticate the administrative state inevitably reoriented
public law thinking away from a right-based theory founded on the Hohfeldian model. For a
penetrating examination, see L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (1965). See, in
particular, id. at 508-09, emphasizing increased focus on "interests" rather than rights. See
generally J. Vining, Legal Identity (1978). Developments in constitutional adjudication followed
apace.
15. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 29-30 (1979) ("[A]s pervasive a role as disputation may play in litigation, it is equally
important to recognize that the function of the judge-a statement of social purpose and a
definition of role-is not to resolve disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public
values.").
16. The analogy of constitutional to common law adjudication broke down with the relaxa-
tion of standing requirements. See infra note 17. And it wholly collapsed with the emergence of
"structural" litigation, where the conflict is, quite plainly, not between an individual and a
specific government official charged with an identifiable and concrete wrong, but between large
groups of individuals and major aspects of the governmental system in which the litigants allege
systemic malfunction and sought system-wide relief. There is, as most readers are aware, consid-
erable writing on this topic. For an especially lucid presentation of the difference between the
premises of litigation seeking structural reform and older conceptions of the judicial task, see
Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 626 (1981).
17. This shift is most apparent in standing; the older requirement of a common law (Hliohfel-
dian) plaintiff became mixed up with and then gave way to standing, see J. Vining, supra note 14,
at 55-56 (discussing the late emergence of the concept of standing in public law). Standing in turn
was reduced to a simple requirement of injury in fact-with injury being expansively construed to
embrace economic and even aesthetic injuries. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). Indeed, on occasion the Court acknowledges
as much. With increasing frequency, its opinions refer to the standing requirement in functional
terms: its office, the Court tells us, is not to protect rights, but to maintain the conditions for
sensible constitutional adjudication, including the avoidance of unwarranted conflict with the
other branches of government. See Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-
22 (1974); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
18. For example, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983) (likelihood of future
irreparable injury to victim of police chokehold held insufficient for federal equitable remedy),
[Vol. 84:277
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understood constitutional law, the language and categories of analysis derived
from the older paradigm continue to structure legal discourse. This is in part
because adequate new conceptual tools have yet to be formulated, and in part
because the protection of private rights still remains an important judicial
concern. Not surprisingly, however, while the old categories formally obtain,
they have been bent, distended, and reshaped to accommodate the imperatives
of the public action. The consequence is doctrinal confusion and anomalous
results,' 9 a pattern likely to continue until the premises of the public action
paradigm are directly confronted and fully embraced.20
We are, at a minimum, badly in need of a systematic rethinking of such
access mechanisms as rights, implied rights of action, and standing. That task
will require the elaboration of a distinctive conceptual apparatus for public
law. 21 Pending that development, any analysis of the nature of third party
standing in the current period of awkward transition is necessarily tentative.
Still, some such effort seems worthwhile. At least part of the existing confu-
sion seems unnecessary. Moreover, whatever the appropriate paradigm for
constitutional adjudication, third party standing problems will not disappear.
We are not yet ready to dispense with every rule rationing access to the courts
or restricting the kinds of claims that can be presented once access is
granted. 22 Nor are we ready to ignore entirely the autonomy interests of the
states in structuring their own judicial processes in a rational, even-handed
manner.
2 3
demonstrates that the Court's views of "Our Federalism" make it reluctant to embrace openly a
public action model. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 215, 222-23
(1983). See generally Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1982) (cataloguing and decrying the Court's failure to
see clearly the "public nature" of constitutional adjudication).
19. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
20. That process has begun. "Public action" commentators have had increasing impact on
the lower courts. See, e.g., Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
21. Professor Vining would go further. He believes that "we are witnessing... nothing less
than the breakdown of individualism as a basis for legal reasoning." J. Vining, supra note 14, at
2.
22.
Were we to recognize standing premised on an "injury" consisting solely of an alleged
violation of a "'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not establish
religion," . . . a principled consistency would dictate recognition of respondents' stand-
ing to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal right to a
government that does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to chal-
lenge every affirmative-action program on the basis of a personal right to a government
that does not deny equal protection of the laws, to choose but two among as many
possible examples as there are commands in the Constitution.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 489-90 n.26 (1982) (citation omitted).
23. E.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2323 (1983) (stressing "due regard for the
appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts"). Gates went quite far in its avoidance of an
issue "not pressed or passed upon below." Unless narrowed, it suggests that direct challenges to
the authoritative character of Supreme Court decisions must initially be advanced in the state
courts.
1984]
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It is against this background that I want to consider third party standing,
not with a view toward reordering the case law, but in an effort to clarify some
of the more systemic problems. This paper seeks to establish two propositions.
First, much third party standing law can be grounded in a premise shared by
both the public and private rights paradigms-that the protection of individ-
ual rights is an important judicial concern. Many third party standing cases
ought to be understood in first party terms: the litigant is simply asserting a
violation of his own right to be regulated in accordance with a constitutionally
valid rule. This seems true of overbreadth challenges. More importantly, I
hope to show that it is also true of a great many jus tertii challenges. The
litigant is asserting a substantive due process right to interact with a third
party right holder free from unjustifiable governmental interference.
If this analysis is sound, important consequences follow. Claims founded
upon such first party rights are not prey to open-ended invocations of judicial
discretion; and, to the extent that the rights have a federal source, state courts
are compelled to recognize these challenges-at least where a statute is being
enforced in a judicial proceeding against a defendant.
Second, to the extent that a litigant is conceived of as presenting a
genuine third party claim-one not susceptible of a first party formulation-
the litigant is essentially a judicially licensed private attorney general. Talk of
third party standing in these cases obscures the doubtful basis of federal
judicial authority to create such private attorneys general. Except in very
limited circumstances, that authority cannot comfortably be derived from a
private rights model of constitutional adjudication, and its propriety under
the public action model, while plausible, seems to be assumed, not demon-
strated. Moreover, even if the Court can license such private attorneys gen-
eral, it is not clear why such a determination should bind Congress or the state
courts.
I. OVERBREADTH AS FIRST PARTY STANDING
The conventional account of overbreadth cases-in which litigants whose
own conduct is not constitutionally protected are nonetheless permitted to
mount a constitutional attack premised on the rights of parties not before the
court-was that a special third party standing rule had been established for
first amendment cases. In contrast to other rights, the first amendment was
thought to free litigants from the general limitations of as-applied challenges
in permitting them to challenge the "facial" validity of a statute by raising the
"rights" of "hypothetical" third parties.2 4 An avowed speaker of "fighting
words," for example, would have "standing" to challenge a rule that pur-
ported to regulate both his unprotected expression and, say, speech that was
merely "annoying" or "offensive.' '25
24. "[A] litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute
by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before
the court." Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980).
25. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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I see no a priori objection to a special first amendment standing doc-
trine.2 6 But, as I have elsewhere argued,2 7 the special standing doctrine as-
serted by overbreadth theorists has only fragmentary support in Supreme
Court practice and is analytically unsound. My view is that overbreadth
challenges can best be understood within the framework of conventional first
party standing theory. The special status of first amendment claims reflects
the high degree of means-end congruence required under substantive first
amendment law, and not any distinctive standing concept.
While the point seems to have been frequently misunderstood, the essen-
tial attribute of an overbreadth challenge does not lie in its authorizing a facial
challenge. Any litigant has the right to make a facial challenge to the constitu-
tional sufficiency of the rule actually invoked against him, 28 without regard to
whether his own conduct could validly have been regulated by a differently
formulated rule.2 9 To be sure, the "face" of the rule is itself the product of
interpretation. As Yazoo makes plain, "when actually faced with the [consti-
tutional] question, [a court] might narrowly construe the statute to obliterate
the objectionable feature, or it might declare the unconstitutional provisions
separable. ' 3 0 In general, the interpretive process can operate so as to slice the
legislative command to a permissible subrule general enough to cover the facts
of the case before the court. Thus, Yazoo permits the interpreting court to
26. Various constitutional provisions, particularly the first amendment, have important
remedial dimensions. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1975); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83
Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1970). On eighth amendment due process, see, for example, California v.
Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3451 (1983) ("In ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out
arbitrarily or capriciously, the Court's principal concern has been more with the procedure by
which the State imposes the death sentence than with the substantive factors the State lays before
the jury .... ).
27. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
28. "As applied" challenges which are formulated as attacks on a rule rather than direct
claims of privilege are included in the term "facial" challenge. On the overlap between "as
applied" and "facial" challenges, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 590-91.
29. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 n.21 (1982), the Court said:
Overbreadth challenges are only one type of facial attack. A person whose activity may
be constitutionally regulated nevertheless may argue that the statute under which he is
convicted or regulated is invalid on its face. See, e.g., Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 5, 69 S. Ct. 894, 896, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949). See generally Monaghan, Over-
breadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Review 1, 10-14.
Cf. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744-46 (1983) (discussing the holding in Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), that a general guilty verdict must be set aside where it could have
been based on either a statute's valid clauses or its invalid clauses). But see United States v.
Lemons, 697 F.2d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1983).
To avoid misunderstanding, I would note that the claim is not that the litigant can force the
court to articulate any specific rule, but only that the rule actually invoked must be valid.
30. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256 (1953); see also Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra
note 27, at 8; Rohr, supra note 6, at 400-04.
At the margins, due process and first amendment considerations, as well as fundamental
separation-of-powers issues at the federal level, place limits on judicial power to reshape statutes
19841
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defer consideration of possible challenges to future applications of a statute
that would carry its scope beyond that necessary to sustain its immediate
application: the interpretive process could operate pro tanto, so to speak. 3'
But, whether comprehensively narrowed in terms of categorical subrules or
narrowed pro tanto, the rule actually invoked against the litigant by the court
must be facially sound-it must, in other words, track, or fall on the safe side
of, the judicially prescribed boundary line separating protected from unpro-
tected activity, without regard to where the particular litigant's conduct falls
in relation to that line. 32
The distinctive claim of conventional overbreadth theory is in asserting
limits in the name of the first amendment on the otherwise generally acknowl-
edged judicial power to narrow statutes in the process of applying them. 33
Overbreadth theorists argue that, at least in some circumstances, statutes
regulating expression must be judged as written; they cannot be narrowed in
the process of application, even prospectively.3 4 But at this point deep, and to
my eye intractable, problems surface. Despite admirable sophistication, over-
breadth theorists seem wholly unable to specify satisfactory criteria for deter-
mining when, as a matter of constitutional law, courts should and should not
be permitted to truncate statutes in the application process.35 Nor do the
in the application process, particularly if the restructuring occurs at the appellate level. See, e.g.,
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155-59 (1969); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S.
195, 198 (1966).
31. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 6-8.
Yazoo makes plain that the Supreme Court would indulge in a presumption that the state
court will eliminate any objectionable features, at least so long as a valid and plausible construc-
tion of the statute is apparent in the case at bar. That case had come to the Court without any
authoritative construction of the statute by the state courts. But the Court was undeterred. "How
the state court may apply [the statute] to other cases, whether its general words may be treated as
more or less restrained, and how far parts of it may be sustained if others fail, are matters upon
which we need not speculate now." Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217,
220 (1912); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960). The Yazoo presumption is
probably not important where there is an opinion by the state court, and in any event is not
justifiable in cases of heightened scrutiny. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 29-30
(discussing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)).
32. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 8-12. Thus, for example, a bar owner might
be indicted under a statute prohibiting topless dancing "in any public place." The state court is
free to give the statute a narrow construction limiting its applicability to bars. As so construed, the
statute would survive a facial challenge. See New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S.
714 (1981). If, however, the state court construes the phrase "in any public place" more broadly,
the resulting rule would be facially invalid. Cf. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 933 (1975)
(affirming district court's grant of preliminary injunction against enforcement of ordinance
banning topless dancing "in any public place").
33. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 11-19.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Few commentators go so far as to insist that the state courts could never narrow statutes
when they might have an impact on first amendment interests. Id. at 16. Complex distinctions are
therefore needed. See, for example, the discussion of the impressive efforts to bar narrowing
where no "determinate rule of [constitutional] privilege" exists to constrain the statute, in Note,
supra note 4, at 882-90; see also Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 18-19.
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Court's decisions indicate that such limits exist. Although it has had frequent
occasion to point out that a state court has failed adequately to narrow a
challenged statute,3 6 the Court has, with an initial arguable exception, 37 never
clearly imposed any distinctive first amendment limits on the power of state
courts to narrow statutes affecting expression. 3 And recent decisions make
clear that courts are free to construe statutes to avoid unconstitutionality.
Thus, the Court now tells us that state courts need not entertain overbreadth
challenges unless the statute "reaches a substantial number of impermissible
applications," '3 9 a limitation not only lacking significant bite, but one not
peculiar to the first amendment.40 In short, the first amendment comes into
play after the scope of the rule has been set by independent tenets of construc-
tion.
In any event, whatever the limits on judical power to reshape statutes
affecting expression, overbreadth challenges are best understood as invoking
the conventional principle that a litigant's conduct may be regulated only in
accordance with a valid rule. Where the substantive constitutional standard is
more stringent than the rational basis test, this demand translates into a
requirement of significant congruence between the boundaries of the rule and
constitutionally acceptable governmental ends. 41 A rule that proscribes signifi-
cantly more conduct than is justified by the permissible governmental end may
not be applied to the litigant, even though the litigant's own conduct could be
prohibited. This is so not only in the first amendment area, but whenever
significant means-ends congruence is required by the applicable substantive
constitutional law. 42 In sum, overbreadth dispositions are simply determina-
tions on the merits of the litigant's substantive constitutional claim. 43 What
differentiates a first amendment case from other cases is not a special standing
principle but the substantive content of the applicable constitutional law. 44
36. See, for example, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), discussed in Monaghan,
Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 22-23.
37. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (alternative ground). In Thornhil, it
should be recalled, the state courts made no effort to narrow the broadly written statute.
38. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 21; see also United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct.
1702 (1983) (statute severed and severed part held invalid). But the truncating can come too late to
be applied to a specific defendant. In those circumstances the narrowing construction has pro-
spective application only.
39. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982). The Court's earlier formulations of
overbreadth doctrine are recounted in Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 22-23, 27-28.
40. A statute with a substantial number of invalid applications would be open to vagueness
objections. Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1859 n.8 (1983).
41. That requirement has little impact where the rational basis test is the constitutional
standard. Anomalies aside, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the rational basis test has not
been thought to require a close fit between means and ends. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra
note 27, at 38-39.
42. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 37-38.
43. In other words, the litigant's assertion always takes the following form: "I am being
subjected to an invalid rule."
44. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 37.
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To be sure, overbreadth methodology, even as properly understood,
requires consideration of the impact of a rule on third parties. In assessing the
constitutional validity of the operative rule, the court's attention is drawn
away from the litigant's conduct to the rule's reasonably foreseeable applica-
tions to persons not before the court. In that sense we have third party
standing. But, rhetoric aside, the "rights" of third persons are not impli-
cated. 45 Correctly understood, overbreadth challenges involve first, not third,
party standing: "the [overbreadth] claimant is asserting his own right not to
be burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law, though naturally the claim is
not one which depends on the privileged character of his own conduct." 40 This
analysis makes plain why courts must entertain overbreadth challenges in suits
to enforce the statute against a defendant to the extent that the operative
interpretation of the statute takes in more than the defendant's particular
expression. In enforcement proceedings no issue of judicial prudence or dis-
cretion is implicated. The constitutional validity of the rule being applied to
the litigant is directly in issue.47
The foregoing analysis of overbreadth challenges invites a closer look at
jus tertii standing. To what extent is a jus tertii claimant, like the overbreadth
claimant, best understood as "asserting his own right not to be burdened by
an unconstitutional rule of law," rather than seeking the benefit of discretion-
ary rules of judicial practice? 48
II. Jus TERTII STANDING
A. Doctrinal Evolution
The rule that a litigant has standing to raise only his "own" rights has a
long history. The early case law contains no suggestion that this limitation was
understood to be simply a matter of judicial discretion. For example, in Tyler
v. Judges of the Court of Registration,49 the Court, invoking familiar princi-
ples, said:
45. Even if the third parties are participating as amici, they are not before the court in the
sense that their rights are being adjudicated by the decree. For a recent discussion of res judicata
principles, see generally Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2917-25 (1983).
46. Note, supra note 4, at 848 (footnote omitted).
47. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 88 (Supp. 1981) (A "defendant in a coercive
proceeding . . . always has standing to challenge the validity of a statute in the terms in which it
was applied to him."); Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, supra note 10, at 17-
24; cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 497 n.5 (1977) (criminal defendant need not
exhaust inadequate administrative remedies as prerequisite to facial challenge to zoning ordi-
nance). Suits for prospective relief raise different issues. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27,
at 34-36.
48. In examining the issue, I will follow the Court's current practice of using the terms third
party and jus tertii standing interchangeably. Analytically, either term might also embrace some
conceptions of overbreadth challenges. See supra note 6.
49. 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
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The prime object of all litigation is to establish a right asserted by
the plaintiff or to sustain a defence set up by the party pursued. Save
in a few instances where, by statute or the settled practice of the
courts, the plaintiff is permitted to sue for the benefit of another, he
is bound to show an interest in the suit personal to himself, and even
in a proceeding which he prosecutes for the benefit of the public, as,
for example, in cases of nuisance, he must generally aver an injury
peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of his
fellow citizens. 50
Tyler was decided in 1900, and its principles found repeated application
in ensuing decades. 5' But troublesome decisions began to crop up in the first
decades of this century, a concomitant of that period's momentum toward
judicial activism. Pierce v. Society of Sisters5 2 and Truax v. Raich5 3 are among
the best known examples. Pierce apparently permitted schools to raise the
rights of prospective pupils and their parents, 54 and Truax, an employee to
raise the rights of his employer.55 Although these cases are now widely under-
stood as early illustrations of jus tertii standing, they were not so understood
by the Courts that decided them, at least not in any clear sense. To be sure, in
each case the Court considered the challenged statute's impact on third per-
sons, but in the end it emphasized the rights of the litigants before it. In
Pierce, for example, the Court said the litigants "asked protection against
arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with their patrons and the
consequent destruction of their business and property. Their interest is clear
and immediate . . . .-6 And in granting relief, the Court relied upon the
''many ... cases where injunctions have issued to protect business enterprises
against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers." 57 It is, in-
deed, difficult to find in the early case law any holding squarely supporting jus
tertii standing.58 The reason is not hard to find: third party standing seemed to
contravene the fundamental axiom reflected in Tyler that the "duty of...
50. Id. at 406. The opinion of the Court reviews the prior decisions. Id. at 407-09. Four
justices dissented, id. at 411-14 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting), but on the narrow ground that the
litigant sufficiently alleged his own rights.
51. See Rohr, supra note 6, at 396-400 (collecting cases); Stern, Separability and Separability
Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 84-87 (1937) (same). The inseparability cases
are not an exception to the rule that a litigant may assert only his own rights. See infra notes 75-78
and accompanying text.
52. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
53. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
54. 268 U.S. at 535-36; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (reversing the
convictions of a teacher under a statute prohibiting teaching foreign languages but also noting
that the statute interfered with the rights of pupils and their parents); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S.
404 (1923) (same).
55. 239 U.S. at 38-39.
56. 268 U.S. at 536.
57. Id. The same first party standing approach is apparent in Truax, 239 U.S. at 38-39.
58. Most of the cases where such challenges were sustained seem premised on inseparability.
See infra note 76; Sedler, Constitutional Jus Tertii, supra note 6, at 601-12.
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every judicial tribunal" is "limited to determining rights of persons or of
property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it."'
Jus tertii standing as a distinctive legal theory begins in 1953 with the
rationale proffered in Barrows v. Jackson.60 In permitting a white vendor to
raise a black vendee's rights as a defense in a suit charging the vendor with
breach of a racially restrictive covenant, the Court's analysis worked a funda-
mental conceptual shift.0 ' The earlier case law had largely insisted that a
litigant assert his own rights, although Pierce and Truax left open a large
question of what constituted such a claim. In contrast, Barrows explicitly
endorsed the litigant's "standing ... to vindicate the constitutional rights of
some third party,"01 2 insisting in the process that "our rule denying standing to
raise another's rights ... is only a rule of practice." 03 Along with NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson,64 which permitted an organization to raise the first
amendment privacy rights of its members,0 5 Barrows generated a whole series
of modern cases. 6
Frequent efforts were made to confine, or rather restate, the "excep-
tions" to the Yazoo doctrine recognized by the emerging case law. At first it
was believed that such extraordinary third party standing was proper only
where "necessary" to prevent effective denial or material obstruction of the
rights of third parties who could not reasonably be expected to assert them.0 7
In time, "obstruction" was merged into "dilution"; 68 still later, focused
concern with the actual ability of the third party right holder to vindicate his
claims diminished. 69 While it may be an overstatement to say, as does Justice
Brennan, that in constitutional cases the Court now has "only rarely inter-
59. California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893).
60. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
61. Id. at 255-59. Barrows might have been viewed as a narrow exception to the normal rule,
one needed to fill out the principles of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
62. 346 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 257.
64. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
65. Id. at 458-60. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson has never been treated as a case
limited to the first amendment. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 40 n.8 (1981)
(challenge to Medicaid regulations); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 342-45 (1977) (discrimination against interstate commerce). On the limits of representa-
tional standing, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1980) (organization denied standing
because of divergent views of members).
66. Rohr, supra note 6, at 426-42, contains an exhaustive collection of the cases.
67. Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 425. Both Barrows, 346 U.S. at 257, and NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 359, support this reading.
68. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976). More frequently, commentators simply ignore
the difference between the two ideas. See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 431-36; cf. Rohr,
supra note 6, at 420 n.133 (reading commentators who speak of "impairment" and deprivation as
supporting a "dilution" viewpoint).
69. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v.




posed a bar to 'third-party standing,"' 70 it is plain that the strong bias against
such claims presumed by Tyler and Yazoo has substantially dissipated. 71
The depth of the conceptual shift worked by Barrows v. Jackson is made
plain by Craig v. Boren.72 There a vendor successfully challenged a gender-
based discrimination in a prohibition of selling beer to minors. While the
Court's analysis does not entirely ignore the rights of the vendor, its standing
discussion emphasizes the rights of the customers, even though (unlike Pierce)
the statute imposed a duty directly on the vendor, not on her customers. 73 The
Court's discussion of the merits makes the shift even clearer; its focus is
entirely upon the statute's impact on the customers, ignoring any separate
claim by the vendor. 74
The conceptual evolution from Tyler to Barrows has proceeded virtually
without analysis of its fundamental premises by either the Court or commen-
tators. Any continuation of the ad hoc accretion of exceptions tailored to
particular cases that has characterized development of third party standing is
unsatisfactory. This common law approach under the guise of "discretionary
rules of practice" elides and distorts important legal principles. In order to
identify the proper occasions for recognizing third party standing, it is critical
to examine the sources of authority for the claimed power to grant or deny
such standing. Moreover, the evident implications for federal-state relations
and impact on the status of the private rights paradigm suggest that analysis
must be sensitive to the possibility that a monolithic approach may be inade-
quate. Authority, scope, criteria, and limitations may differ depending on
where the suit is brought, which parties hold rights and duties, and the nature
of the claims. It is therefore necessary to disentangle the several issues that
have been indiscriminately lumped under the general rubric of jus tertii stand-
ing.
B. Elaboration of the Central Problems
1. State Law Permitting Third Party Standing. - Third party standing is
on occasion no more than the consequence of conventional inseparability
70. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 493 n.4 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Harvard Note, supra note 5,
at 427-28 ("iT]he Court seems never to have denied standing to assert jus tertii to litigants whose
third party claims appear, as a matter of substantive constitutional law, likely to prevail.")
(footnote omitted). But cf. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014-16 (1976) (denying "next
friend" standing to mother of convicted person who himself refused to appeal to the Supreme
Court).
71. The Court appears quite willing to permit such challenges simply upon a showing of the
existence of certain relationships between the litigant and the third party right holder, such as
those between vendor and customer, or physician and patient. This has led commentators to
conclude, for example, that, without more, either party to a regulated relationship may now assert
the rights of the other. 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §
3531, at 84 (Supp. 1980).
72. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
73. Id. at 195-97.
74. Id. at 197-210.
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doctrine. If the state court holds that a statute is inseparable, the Supreme
Court will address its impact on third parties. 75 But the perception that
statutes can be saved through standard principles of statutory construction
has greatly diminished the frequency of inseparability holdings, and few
modern7 6 third party standing cases can even implicitly be placed upon such a
ground. In any event, inseparability challenges are first party standing cases:
the litigant insists upon his own right to be judged in accordance with a
constitutionally valid rule.77
Federal court consideration of third party challenges grounded upon the
inseparability of state statutes is readily harmonized with current understand-
ings of "Our Federalism." In an important sense, the challenge rests upon
state permission; the content of state law permits consideration of the statute's
impact on third persons.78 A closely analogous situation exists where the state
court-not acting under any presumed federal compulsion-itself permits a
litigant to assert third party rights. City of Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital79 is illustrative. There a hospital sued a municipality to recover for
75. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 10. The root idea of inseparability is clear
enough. Many statutes are susceptible to both valid and invalid applications. Sometimes, as a
matter of construction, the statute is held to be "inseparable"-that is, a nullity unless good in all
of its reasonable and foreseeable applications. In these circumstances the litigant is permitted to
attack the statute without regard to the quality of his own conduct. A holding of inseparability
occurs most typically when the court concludes that, given the nature or range of the act's invalid
applications, the legislature would not want the statute to stand at all, and, less frequently, when
the court is simply unable to restructure the statute so as to sever the valid from invalid
applications. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1960). Instances of judicial inability to
reshape the statute aside, the core idea of the inseparability doctrine is one of legislative intent,
The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat ... the validity of
its remaining provisions. Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted
those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932); see also Monaghan,
Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 6-8. For a recent illustration of an inseparability holding at the
federal level, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40
(1982). Cf. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2774-76 (1983) (raising the related problem of
whether interrelated sections in a general statutory framework may be severed from a constitu-
tionally tainted provision).
76. Some, perhaps all, of the Court's jus tertii decisions prior to the 1940's might at least be
rationalized on conventional inseparability principles: without being any too clear about what it
was doing, the Court frequently assumed that the statute under consideration was inseparable.
See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 10-11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), is explicable under similar principles: since the physicians and Planned Parenthood
director were charged as accessories to an offense under state law, the validity of the underlying
offense was necessarily drawn into question. Id. at 481.
77. Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 27, at 9-11.
78. Whether a state statute is separable is a matter for the state courts. See, for example,
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296, 2309 (1983); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 521 n.26 (1981). But see City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive Center, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2501
n.37 (1983) (assuming, erroneously and without discussion, that it should decide the issue of
separability).
79. 103 S. Ct. 2979 (1983). Revere is not a perfect example, because it seems clear that the
Supreme Court independently believed jus tertii standing was a proper exercise of "judicial
discretion."
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medical services it rendered to a person injured while being taken into police
custody. The state court was of opinion that the municipality was required by
the eighth amendment both to offer the medical services and to reimburse the
hospital for providing them. Before reaching the question of the injured
person's right to treatment, the Court addressed a challenge to the hospital's
standing to raise that issue. 80 After noting that the hospital's claim for reim-
bursement satisfied article III's requirement of "injury in fact," and asserting
that the prudential reasons for denying third party standing were "much
weaker" than in Craig v. Boren,8' the Court said:
In this case, as in Craig, the plaintiff's assertion of jus tertii was
not contested in the lower court,... and that court entertained the
constitutional claim on its merits. Unlike Craig, this case arose in
state court and the plaintiff, MGH, prevailed. The Supreme Judicial
Court, of course, is not bound by the prudential limitations on jus
tertii that apply to federal courts. The consequence of holding that
MGH may not assert the rights of a third party.., in this Court,
therefore, would be to dismiss the writ of certiorari, leaving intact
the state court's judgment in favor of MGH, the purportedly im-
proper representative of the third party's constitutional rights. See
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434-35 ... (1952).
In these circumstances, invoking prudential limitations on MGH's
assertion of jus tertii would "serve no functional purpose." Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S., at 194 .... 82
This analysis is inadequate. Doremus, after all, had permitted the state court's
judgment to stand "intact. '83 Apparently, Doremus is to be distinguished
because it rested upon the lack of an article III case or controversy, rather
than upon the Court's self-imposed "prudential limitations." Such a distinc-
tion is not altogether satisfying. Both article III and the prudential limitations
have been thought to be informed by a common purpose: shielding the Court
from the decision of constitutional questions except when strictly necessary. 84
Indeed, the Court had specifically invoked that policy as a major justification
for the general ban against jus tertii standing.85 As it is formulated, this
justification cannot be reduced solely to federalism concerns. Thus, it is not a
80. The state court deemed the issue of the hospital's standing to raise the injured person's
right to treatment to have been settled by the municipality's failure to object in briefs or
argument. See Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. City of Revere, 385 Mass. 772, 776 n.7, 434 N.E.2d
185, 188 n.7 (1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2979 (1983). There is no indication that the state court felt its
decision was compelled by federal, rather than state, standing principles. It cited Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), only to illustrate that "standing to litigate constitutional issues is
sometimes granted to persons asserting the rights of others." Revere, 385 Mass. at 776 n.7, 434
N.E.2d at 188 n.7 (emphasis added).
81. Revere, 103 S. Ct. at 2982.
82. Id. at 2982-83 (footnote omitted).
83. In Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), the Court dismissed an appeal from
a state court decision that rejected an establishment clause challenge to the practice of distributing
Bibles in the public schools.
84. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947).
85. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). But see Harvard Note, supra note 5, at
436-38, arguing that reliance on this policy to bar jus tertii challenges is misplaced.
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sufficient response to say that, where a state court chooses to abandon protec-
tion against federal intrusion into its policymaking, the Supreme Court may
review the judgment because any specific state autonomy interest has been
dissolved and the federal interest in uniform interpretation of national laws
may then be taken as paramount.
Nonetheless, there is considerable force to the argument that review is
proper in Revere. Any policy grounded in the avoidance of unnecessary
constitutional adjudication must be harmonized with fundamental assump-
tions about the role of the states in the federal system. This accommodation
might well yield the inference that the states are free to create legal interests
and to define their scope."6 Broad grants of authority to challenge exercises of
governmental power are but one type of legal interest. Thus, if the state court
recognizes jus tertii standing in an otherwise genuine controversy, it is not
clear why any general policy disfavoring Supreme Court consideration of
"unnecessary" constitutional claims should operate to bar the challenge.8 7 We
may, therefore, assume that a bank should be able to raise the rights of its
customers, or a hospital its patients, if the state law permits such challenges. 88
2. Federal Compulsion to Grant Third Party Standing. - Revere empha-
sizes that "of course," the state court "is not bound by the prudential
limitations" on third party standing "that apply to federal courts." But our
main inquiry is of a different order: is the state court equally free to disregard
Supreme Court decisions recognizing jus tertii standing? Is there any federal
law compulsion underlying jus tertii doctrine? If so, what is its source? An
imaginary opinion suggested by the abortion cases will serve to focus that
inquiry.
Doe v. Bolton,89 it will be recalled, permitted physicians to raise the rights
of their patients in an anticipatory federal court challenge that invalidated a
modern abortion statute.90 Doe presented an appealing case for such standing;
86. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 160, strongly so suggests: "Why should Article III be
regarded as placing any limits on the power of the states to create . . . legal interests, providing
they are genuine?"
87. Such an analysis suggests that the Court's prudential rules have a strong federalism
component, the "protection" of which the states are free to abandon, here as elsewhere. For
example, states may waive the protection of sovereign immunity, e.g., Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 52 U.S.L.W. 4155, 4157 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1984), and the protection of the
Younger doctrine, see Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodery, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977).
Cf. Graddick v. Newman, 453 U.S. 928, 934 (1981) (representative capacity of state attorney
general under state law).
88. Cf. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 51-52, 71-72 (1974) (declining to
rule on whether bank may assert claims of depositors where such claims are themselves held to be
premature). Revere may be thought to be a specific illustration of the more embracing proposition
that, for purposes of Supreme Court review of a state judgment, a vendor (broadly conceived)
may challenge a state statute on the basis of his customers' rights if the state law so permits. I
leave to the side the question whether such state law could also be relied upon in the federal trial
court.
89. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
90. Id. at 188. For a narrower but unpersuasive reading, see Rohr, supra note 6, at 412.
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the physicians not only suffered economic and professional harm from the
statute's operation, but also (unlike the schools in Pierce) were placed by its
terms under an enforceable legal duty.9 1 Suppose that, following Doe, a
physician in another state is convicted for violating an identically worded
statute. The supreme court of the state renders the following opinion in State
v. Smith:
Per Curiam. Defendant, a physician, stands convicted for perform-
ing abortions in violation of the state abortion statute. The state
argues that as applied to this defendant the statute is a reasonable
exercise of governmental power, that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), is not to the contrary because the constitutional right of a
woman to obtain an abortion does not measure the rights of her
physician, and that, whatever the rule in the federal courts, our
established doctrine is that the physician may assert only his own
rights and not the rights of his patients. The argument must be
rejected. The Supreme Court has frequently recognized jus tertii
standing, specifically including the right of physicians subject to an
abortion statute to raise the rights of their patients. Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 178, 188 (1973); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106
(1976). Moreover, the Court assumes that its recognition of jus tertii
standing binds the state, as well as the federal, courts without regard
to the content of the state law. See, for example, Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1953); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46
(1972). Doe v. Bolton is, accordingly, controlling, and the judgment
must be reversed.9 2
Such an opinion would scarcely be noticed. But I think that it raises
difficult and complex issues in need of clarification. Ordinarily the litigant
takes the procedural rules and remedial structures of the state courts as he
finds them, unless those rules and structures are themselves unconstitutional
or otherwise preempted. 93 Under the Supreme Court's apparent assumption
91. In Pierce, the Society of Sisters might, in fact, have been placed under a legal obliga-
tion-the Society ran an orphanage, and the statute was addressed to all persons having custody
of children. 268 U.S. at 530, n.*. But the Court made no special mention of that fact.
92. The hypothetical may be faulted, perhaps, for ignoring the incomprehensible suggestions
in the Court's opinions that a woman only shares her right with her physician. See The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 84 (1983).
93. Professor Hart insisted that litigants asserting federal claims in the state courts take those
courts as they find them. Accordingly, federal litigants are bound by all nondiscriminatory state
laws not themselves independently unconstitutional. Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 52
U.S.L.W. 4131, 4140 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). I disagree with that
formulation. In principle, some nondiscriminatory state rules could so burden the federal right or
defense as to be preempted, even though the identical rule could be applied to state claims.
Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 399 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting). See generally Brilmayer,
State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 741
(1982). In practice, the difference between the nondiscrimination and the excessive-burden posi-
tions is not likely to be great. Few nondiscriminatory state rules will be held to be preempted.
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that jus tertii standing turns largely upon its own notions of prudence and
discretion, it is difficult to locate the source of any supposed compulsion on
the state courts to adhere to such rules of practice."4 If no affirmative federal
law drives the doctrine, why is a state court's refusal to permit such a third
party standing challenge not an adequate and independent state ground?9 s If it
is not, is that because something special inheres in the physician-patient
relationship? Must a criminal defendant be permitted to raise a greater range
of jus tertii challenges than other litigants?96 Would denial of third party
standing constitute an adequate and independent state ground if it occurred
(as in Doe v. Bolton) in a suit by the physician for prospective relief?9 7 If so,
what is the source for a distinction, as a matter of federal law, between
offensive and defensive use of third party standing in the state courts? Or, at
least in analogous cases where the state court denies third party standing, are
all of these inquiries wide of the mark? Even if no third party challenge as
such is required by federal law in such a case, is the state conviction invalid
because the litigant is asserting his own rights, not those of his patient? 8
94. Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) ("[A state court] should not be
compelled to entertain an overbreadth attack when not required to do so by the Constitution.");
see also Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582-83 (1981) ("[Blecause this Court has no supervi-
sory authority over state courts, our review is confined to whether there is a constitutional
violation.").
95. There are many illustrations of the efficacy of state procedural and remedial rules in
barring Supreme Court review of federal claims. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 544-46;
Brilmayer, supra note 93, at 749-62. The suggestion that there is no difference between state and
federal statutes regarding the scope of the issues open to a litigant, see, e.g., Heald v. District of
Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123 (1922); Sedler, Constitutional Jus Tertii, supra note 6, at 605 n.34,
fails to take into account not only the authority of the state courts to interpret state statutes, but
also the adequate and independent state ground doctrine.
96. Professor Tribe asserts that "the target of a criminal prosecution should always have
standing to argue that his compliance with the law would have deprived others of their constitu-
tional rights . . . ." L. Tribe, supra note 4, at 107 (emphasis in original).
97. State procedural grounds that result in a denial of due process will not bar Supreme
Court review. E.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955). But there is no general due process right
to a declaratory judgment, although some federal rights require provision of an adequate state
remedy. Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); Monaghan, First Amendment
"Due Process," supra note 25, at 547-49. Oddly, if prospective relief is a necessary concomitant
of a federal right, availability of such relief in federal courts may not free the states from an
obligation to provide it as well. Compare Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), with General Oil
Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
98. The foregoing inquiries might be sharpened somewhat if we suppose that, in the context
of denying a petition for rehearing in State v. Smith, the state supreme court were to add another
paragraph to its opinion:
To deny jus tertii standing here would disserve the interests of "Our Federalism." Even
if this conviction were to withstand reversal in the Supreme Court because it rested upon
an adequate and independent state ground, defendant could then proceed to the federal
district court, raise the rights of his patients in a class action, Doe v. Bolton, and enjoin
future prosecutions under the statute. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). That
result having been obtained, defendant might then be entitled to federal habeas relief;
under Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra, it seems that the Court's third party standing rules are
applicable to federal habeas corpus. Moreover, the writ is generally available to one held
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The propriety of Supreme Court review of state decisions denying third
party standing depends upon whether, in fact, the state court is compelled
under federal law to adhere to federal jus tertii principles. This determination
in turn would seem to rest upon one of three different theories. The first,
rooted in the constitutional text and the structure it creates, focuses upon the
general duty of the state courts to enforce federal law. The latter two, based
on substantive federal principles, take the form of claims that: (a) the litigant
is asserting his own rights and not the rights of a third person and (b) the
litigant acts as a federally licensed private attorney general when he asserts the
rights of other persons. Each of these theories will be considered in turn. 99
III. THEORETicAL FOUNDATIONS FOR Jus TERTI STANDING
A. State Court Enforcement of Federal Law
Where, as in Barrows v. Jackson'00 and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,'0 denial of a defense by the state court would destroy or materially
obstruct a third party's constitutional or federal statutory rights, state com-
pulsion to recognize third party standing might be grounded on inferences
having their source in the structure of government created by the Constitu-
tion. 02 The state courts have a vital role in the constitutional design, and an
analysis of that role could yield a conclusion that the state courts must
acknowledge some third party defenses.10 3 Otherwise, the state judicial ma-
in custody pursuant to a statute subsequently held unconstitutional. Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1880).
Whatever the force or accuracy of these conclusions, they do not by themselves demonstrate
that the state court is obligated to entertain third party challenges. Under current law, an adequate
and independent state ground barring direct review exists even if it would not foreclose a later
habeas action. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963). But cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977) (same standard on habeas and direct review involving contemporaneous objection rules);
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (same). Nor does a future injunction wipe out the prior
convictions. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (affirming injunction against future,
but not completed, prosecutions).
99. The discussion that follows has relevance for several cognate problems. Consider, for
example, the problem of class actions, where the named plaintiff asserts not only his own rights,
but those of third parties-other members of his class. Must the state courts also follow Supreme
Court decisions on the scope of class actions asserting constitutional claims? See H.L. v. Mathe-
son, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), in which both the majority and dissenting opinions proceed on such a
premise. Must the state courts follow the Supreme Court as to when class actions remain viable
even though the named plaintiff no longer has a personal interest in the case? Cf. United States
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980) (expiration of named representative's
substantive claim does not moot issue of class certification). See generally Rohr, supra note 6, at
442-54.
100. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
101. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
102. See generally C. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969).
103. See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 431-38, 517-26; id. at 119-20 (Supp.
1981).
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chinery itself would work a denial of federal rights, 04 and the supremacy
clause would be drained of significant meaning. 0 5
The state courts' obligation to enforce federally created rights of action is
more troublesome. 10 Some compulsion exists: "discrimination" against fed-
eral rights is prohibited, 0 7 a principle that, despite judicial hesitation, 08 seems
fully applicable to section 1983 suits. 09 If the antidiscrimination principle is
given wide enough scope, state court refusal to entertain jus tertii claims might
be condemned on this ground. It might, for example, be argued that imper-
missible discrimination would exist in State v. Smith if the state court ordinar-
ily permitted private parties to enforce zoning by-laws, or permitted third
party beneficiaries to sue on contracts." 0 In sum, the antidiscrimination
principle stands as a potentially important constraint against self-regarding
state rules."'
104. Indeed, this analysis suggests that the state court must raise the issue sua sponle.
105. U.S. Const. art. VI. A distinction between constitutional and statutory jus tertii might
at first blush seem both important and illuminating. Congress can limit enforcement of federal
statutory duties to the federal courts, The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429-30 (1867),
and it can limit and shape those duties. It seems plausible, therefore, that any state "duty" to
enforce federal statutory defenses might stand on weaker footing, absent an explicit congressional
requirement, than does the state courts' duty to enforce constitutionally based defenses. Congress
cannot "unconstitutionally" regulate the jurisdiction of the state courts, and to the extent that jus
tertii standing is constitutionally required, it must be given effect by the state court. Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 5, at 359-60. But the distinction between statutory and constitutional
defenses will not bear much weight: generally, it must be presumed that Congress intended to
prohibit any state law that would materially obstruct the enforcement of federal statutory
defenses.
106. That state courts "may" enforce federal rights has long been clear. See, e.g., Gulf
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981). Jurisdiction over federal claims is
ordinarily assumed to be concurrent. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 266 (1982). A question
remains whether if a state chooses to enforce such federal rights, it must apply all the ancillary
statutory and judicial baggage: federal procedural rules, attorneys' fees, nonexhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, jus tertii, etc. Cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980) (holding that §
1988's provision for attorneys' fees applies to claims of federal statutory violations brought in
state courts under § 1983).
107. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760-63
(1982) (reaffirming and explicating Testa); cf. id. at 784-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Tesid does
not extend to state legislative bodies). We are dealing only with the duty of the state courts and
perhaps other state adjudicatory bodies. The extent to which Congress can impose affirmative
enforcement duties on state officials outside the adjudicatory context raises more complex issues,
as FERC v. Mississippi makes plain.
108. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). By its own terms § 1983 does not require jus tertii
standing; indeed, despite judicial assumptions to the contrary, Rohr, supra note 6, at 460 n.289, it
is not clear that the statute even contemplates such actions.
110. An argument that such suits are sufficiently analogous to trigger application of Testa is
at least plausible if enough emphasis is placed on Testa's premise that "state courts have a unique
role in enforcing the body of federal law." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760 (1982).
111. My own view is that Testa v. Katt's antidiscrimination principle does not state the outer
limits of the state court duty to enforce federal substantive rights. To my mind Congress may, if it
chooses, require the state courts to enforce federal rights regardless of whether they enforce
analogous state claims. But see Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188-90 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). For me, Testa's central importance is as a working principle of "Our Federalism."
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Nonetheless, an adequate general account of jus tertii standing cannot be
derived solely from structurally grounded principles governing the duty of
state courts to enforce federal law. That duty, such as it is, is a limited one-
unless the antidiscrimination principle is given wide scope." 2 More impor-
tantly, no analysis grounded in the duty of state courts to enforce federal law
can account for the principal font of jus tertii standing: the federal courts.
What warrant justifies the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in
creating jus tertii "exceptions" to the normal rules of standing? 113 The need
for a unified rationale of jus tertii standing impels one toward viewing the
proponent of a jus tertii challenge as either asserting his own rights or acting
as a federally licensed private attorney general.
B. Jus Tertii as First Party Standing: Interactive Liberty
1. Case Law Foundations: Buchanan v. Warley. - Pierce and Truax
make plain that many jus tertii claims might be understood to involve the
litigant's own rights, not those of third persons, even though the impact of the
statute on third persons must be considered in order to adjudicate the liti-
gant's own claim. This insight becomes particularly clear with Buchanan v.
Warley,1 4 another decision from the same era. In Buchanan, a white vendor
Federal statutes ordinarily should be read to require no more than nondiscrimination. No federal
statute purports to impose a general requirement of jus tertii. Indeed, while I recognize that jus
tertii claims have been assumed to be appropriate in § 1983 cases, it is by no means evident from
its terms that a litigant may invoke any rights other than his own. See supra note 109.
Wholly apart from Congress's power to co-opt state adjudicatory machinery, it has long
seemed to me that the state courts are required by the Constitution to provide adequate remedies
for constitutional guarantees. I think that the state courts must give appropriate restitutionary
relief for breach of federally imposed duties, see Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17
(1920), and that they must provide adequate injunctive relief to protect rights secured by the
takings clause and the first amendment. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," supra
note 26, at 547-49. But even if this general premise is correct, it does not readily generate a
corollary demand that the state courts permit jus tertii standing. I would add that the duty of the
state courts to provide rights of action and remedies to implement constitutional obligations needs
to be reassessed in light of two developments: (a) the expansion of § 1983 to include all statutory
claims, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), and (b) the widespread creation of causes of
action based directly on the Constitution itself, see, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
112. This conclusion is not altered if the issue of jus tertii standing arises in the context of the
assertion of federal defenses. While the supremacy clause undoubtedly demands that state courts
entertain federal defenses, it does not define the scope of that duty. It could be read to require no
more than nondiscrimination. In any event, one cannot extract from that clause a general
mandate that the state courts must permit a defendant to invoke the rights of third persons. Some
source of federal law other than the supremacy clause itself must be invoked to trigger the
applicability of the clause.
113. Reliance on the state courts' duty to enforce federal substantive law as a source for
federal court standing exceptions is particularly troublesome where no version of that duty would
require a state court to generate a corresponding exception.
114. 245 U.S. 60 (1917), discussed in Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court
and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 444, 498-
523 (1982).
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sued to compel a black vendee to take title to property under a contract for
sale. The contract expressly made the vendee's duty conditional upon his right
to reside on the property, thus putting in issue the validity of a local Jim Crow
ordinance that forbade occupancy (but not purchase) of the premises if the
occupant's race did not predominate on his street. The highest court of the
state sustained the ordinance against a fourteenth amendment challenge,'"
and the vendor obtained a writ of error from the Supreme Court." 0 That
Court, in turn, unanimously held the ordinance invalid. It appears that Justice
Holmes prepared, but did not file, a dissent. "It is possible," he wrote, "that
the ordinance unduly abridges the constitutional rights of the blacks, but that
question is not before us. The plaintiff is a white man and cannot avail himself
of this collateral mode of attack, on the ground of a wrong to some one
else."" 7 The Court did not disagree with Holmes' anti-jus tertii premise, nor
could it comfortably permit a white vendor to raise the rights of blacks when a
specific black defendant was relying upon the ordinance. But the Court denied
that a third party challenge was involved.
The objection is made that this writ of error should be dis-
missed because the alleged denial of constitutional rights involves
only the rights of colored persons, and the plaintiff in error is a
white person. This court has frequently held that while an unconsti-
tutional act is no law, attacks upon the validity of laws can only be
entertained when made by those whose rights are directly affected by
the law or ordinance in question. Only such persons, it has been
settled, can be heard to attack the constitutionality of the law or
ordinance. But this case does not run counter to that principle.
The property here involved was sold by the plaintiff in error, a
white man, on the terms stated, to a colored man; the action for
specific performance was entertained in the court below, and in both
courts the plaintiff's right to have the contract enforced was denied
solely because of the effect of the ordinance making it illegal for a
colored person to occupy the lot sold. But for the ordinance the state
courts would have enforced the contract, and the defendant would
have been compelled to pay the purchase price and take a convey-
ance of the premises. The right of the plaintiff in error to sell his
property was directly involved and necessarily impaired because it
was held in effect that he could not sell the lot to a person of color
who was willing and ready to acquire the property, and had obli-
115. Buchanan v. Warley, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472 (1915), rev'd, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The
court also had before it a challenge by a black defendant charged with violating the ordinance.
Harris v. City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472 (1915).
116. Buchanan's structure as a test case in the Supreme Court raises a question whether it
contravened the rule against collusive suits. See Schmidt, supra note 114, at 498, 505-06. Since the
municipality took over the defense of the ordinance before the case reached the Supreme Court,
no insuperable article III problem seems to have existed. Compare INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct.
2764, 2778 (1983) (formal intervention by Congress ensured concrete adverseness), and Richard-
son v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 34-40 (1974) (joinder of adverse party avoided mootness), with
United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (suit held to be collusive despite intervention of
United States).
117. Schmidt, supra note 114, at 512. Holmes did not consider whether, on the opinion of
the court below, the ordinance was inseparable.
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gated himself to take it. This case does not come within the class
wherein this court has held that where one seeks to avoid the en-
forcement of a law or ordinance he must present a grievance of his
own,.and not rest the attack upon the alleged violation of another's
rights. In this case the property rights of the plaintiff in error are
directly and necessarily involved. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
38.118
The Court's view was, in essence, that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protected the litigant against economic injury resulting
from unjustified discrimination against third persons with whom he sought to
interact. This also seems to be the precise point of the challenges sustained in
Pierce and Truax." 9 Taken together, these cases establish a sweeping (and
quite modern) proposition: a litigant asserts his own rights (not those of a
third person) when he seeks to void restrictions that directly impair his free-
dom to interact with a third person who himself could not be legally prevented
from engaging in the interaction. 2 0 This proposition does not depend on any
endorsement of the extraordinary protection accorded property during the
Pierce-Buchanan era. But it does depend on a development that accompanied
and served as an underpinning for that protection: the expansive range of
interests subsumed under the "liberty" protected by the due process
clauses.' 2 ' In Meyer v. Nebraska,'22 the Court summarized that conception.
"Liberty," the Court said,
118. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 72-73.
119. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), upon which Buchanan relies, supports this view. An
alien employee brought suit to challenge restrictions on hiring aliens imposed by the state on
employers.
It is further urged that the complainant cannot sue save to redress his own grievance;
... that is, that the servant cannot complain for the master, and that it is the master
who is subject to prosecution, and not the complainant. But the act undertakes to
operate directly upon the employment of aliens and if enforced would compel the
employer to discharge a sufficient number of his employ~s to bring the alien quota
within the prescribed limit. It sufficiently appears that the discharge of the complainant
will be solely for the purpose of meeting of the requirements of the act and avoiding
threatened prosecution under its provisions. It is, therefore, idle to call the injury
indirect or remote. It is also entirely clear that unless the enforcement of the act is
restrained the complainant will have no adequate remedy, and hence we think that the
case falls within the class in which, if the unconstitutionality of the act is shown,
equitable relief may be had.
Id. at 38-39 (citations omitted).
120. See Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 Stan. L. Rev. 433,
446 (1962). The result could be framed in terms of derivative or corollary rights. A constitutional
right in A (women or blacks) generates a correlative right in B (physicians or whites). But this
formulation seems to me to be vulnerable to Occam's razor; upon examination, its content
inevitably reduces to the simpler Buchanan due process formulation. But see Harvard Note, supra
note 5, at 434-35 (reading Pierce as a third party standing case, and arguing that such standing
was appropriate because of a special circumstance: the deprivation of the third parties' (parents'
and pupils') constitutional rights was caused by the severe impact of the statute on the private
schools-whereas the existence of a relationship between the parents and the schools would not be
enough to permit the third party challenge had the private schools been able to remain open).
121. The watershed was Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897). See Monaghan,
Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 412-13 (1977).
122. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. 23
Under Meyer, protection against economic loss would be a sufficient condi-
tion for judicial intervention, but it would not be a necessary one. The core of
the complaint is the damage done to the litigant's constitutionally protected
"liberty" and "property" as a result of allegedly unjustified governmental
interference with interactive private ordering.
So understood, the foregoing cases would cover the whole ground of
Barrows v. Jackson 24 and Craig v. Boren. 25 Each would be seen as a first
party-not a third party-standing case. In each case the patrons could assert
a right to interact with the vendor free from unjustified governmental discrim-
ination: the vendor in fact asserts a symmetrical right to freedom from that
governmental interference. Indeed, the parallel between Buchanan and Bar-
rows is striking. In both, a white vendor seeks to escape from injury as a result
of illegal discrimination against blacks; moreover, in Barrows the vendor
seeks to avoid a legal duty imposed upon her by state enforcement of the
restrictive covenant. 2 6 Despite that parallel, and the fact that Barrows was
argued in first party terms,'2 7 the Court assumed that the vendor's standing to
obtain judicial consideration of the discrimination claim depended on permit-
ting an exception to the normal first party standing rule.
But unlike Shelley ... no non-Caucasian is before the Court claim-
ing to have been denied his constitutional rights. May [the vendor],
whom petitioners seek to coerce by an action to pay damages for her
failure to honor her restrictive covenant, rely on the invasion of the
rights of others in her defense to this action? 28
123. Id. at 399.
124. 346 U.S. 249 (1953), discussed supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
125. 429 U.S. 190 (1976), discussed supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
126. Judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action under
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
127. See Brief for Petitioners at 16-17 ("[The constitutionality of any state action is tested
by the rights of the individuals before the court only."). Respondent apparently agreed. See Brief
for Respondents at 15-16.
128. 346 U.S. at 254-55. The Court may have been influenced by the third party analysis
applied in the state courts:
The fact that the non-Caucasian is not a party to the action ... does not affect the
result.. . . [E]nforcement of the covenant would effectively deny non-Caucasian citizens
equality in the enjoyment of property rights because property owners in restricted areas
are deterred from permitting use or occupancy by non-Caucasians lest they be personally
liable for damages.
Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 553-54, 247 P.2d 99, 112-13 (1952) (footnote
omitted), aff'd, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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The Barrows approach generated a fundamental reorientation in our
conception of the scope of the issues open to a litigant. Development of first
party standing theory in relation to the scope of the litigant's right to interact
with third persons aborted; in its place, the Court and commentators substi-
tuted an unanalyzed and indeterminate concept of third party standing. The
root assumption of Barrows and the modern decisions seems to be that
because the third party would have had standing to complain, first party
standing could not be established for the litigant's own claim. The idea was
lost that both parties to a contract, potential contract, or other interactive
transaction are asserting symmetrical first party claims in objecting to govern-
mental interference with the relationship. 1 9
Despite the Court's general willingness to permit jus tertii challenges, 130
the difference between conceptualizing the litigant's claim in first party rather
than third party terms has considerable potential importance beyond generat-
ing different results in marginal or limiting cases. Clarity of understanding is
gained when organizing concepts are sorted out coherently. Moreover, a first
party standing analysis undermines any notion that we are dealing with discre-
tionary rules of judicial practice. Where the litigant is asserting his own rights,
the judicial imperative to consider the claim is most pressing. Failure to do so,
at least in an enforcement proceeding, would raise severe problems under the
due process clauses, as well as under article III if the proceeding is in the
federal courts.13'
2. Methodology. - Given the potential importance of the distinction
between first and third party claims, it is crucial to specify when it can be said
that a litigant is asserting his own rights, not those of third persons. Quite
obviously, analysis must begin with an eye fixed on the substantive reach of
129. The interactive analysis in the text, it should be noted, would permit a potential listener
to challenge specific restrictions on speakers, even if it be assumed that the first amendment is
itself concerned only with the rights of speakers. See Rohr, supra note 6, at 428-29 (discussing
cases); cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-69 (1982) (first amendment is also concerned
with right to receive information and ideas). Moreover, the analysis is not inconsistent with
suspect class theory, even if it is viewed through Ely's legislative malfunction lens. See J. Ely,
Democracy and Distrust (1980). Legislation that manifests process malfunctions in the form of
discriminatory classifications is not less flawed when challenged by nonmembers of the target
class. While at first glance the fact that X has been unconstitutionally victimized might not seem
to generate a conclusion that Y can complain, the Buchanan line of decisions supports precisely
such a conclusion: a litigant asserts his own interest in seeking escape from injuries to his
substantive right to interact free of unjustifiable discrimination directed at others.
130. Even some of the decisions denying third party standing only postponed, but did not
ultimately avoid, the constitutional issue. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)
(sidestepping merits of challenge to exclusionary zoning), with Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (reaching merits), and Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (finding standing to challenge "racial
steering").
131. Exhaustive discussion of this point is beyond the compass of this article. See generally
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 309-418; Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953).
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the relevant constitutional or statutory provision. A constitutional provision
need not be interpreted as having a single class of beneficiaries. The first
amendment's protection could be interpreted to run independently to both
speakers and listeners, the fourth amendment's to both property owners and
their invitees, and the sixth amendment's jury trial guarantee against racial
and gender discrimination to both would-be jurors and criminal defendants. 132
Similarly, in Rogers v. Paul,133 the Court permitted students to challenge a
racially based allocation of teachers on the ground that such an "allocation of
faculty denies them equality of educational opportunity.' ' 3 4 Issues of this
character turn entirely on the substantive reach of the particular provision.
Our concern, however, is not with the situation where there are two or more
separate beneficiaries of a specific constitutional right. We are concerned with
exploring first party challenges based solely on the general protection of
liberty secured by due process.
When the litigant seeks escape from a legal duty or disability imposed on
him, some measure of first party standing is necessarily involved. But, by
itself, this proposition doesn't help much: it fails to illuminate the scope of the
first party standing. Suppose, for example, that a statute precludes "blacks,
aliens and women" from holding property. 35 An alien could, of course,
challenge the disabilities placed upon his class, but (absent a conclusion of
inseparability) he could not challenge the parallel disabilities imposed on the
other excluded classes. 36
More importantly, it would be a mistake to assume that first party
challenges are restricted to instances in which the litigant challenges the impo-
sition of a legal disability on him. 3 7 Any such limitation would correspond to
no defensible constitutional policy. 38 Moreover, Pierce, Truax, and Bu-
132. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524 (1975) (male defendant challenges jury
exclusion of women); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 495 (1972) (white defendant challenges
exclusion of blacks from juries). In City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 103 S. Ct. 2979,
2983 n.5 (1983), the Court recognized this point, albeit somewhat obliquely. On the close
relationship between the case or controversy doctrines and the merits of the underlying claim, see
Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1139 (1977).
133. 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
134. Id. at 200.
135. Precisely the same situation occurs if the statute takes the form: "No person other than
white males may own property."
136. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972); Sprout v. City of
South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 167 (1928); Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.S.
516, 530 (1914).
137. Professor Tribe comes close to viewing situations where the litigant is under a legal
restriction as involving first party standing claims. L. Tribe, supra note 4, at 104. But he then
assumes that the absence of a legal restriction on the litigant means that a third party claim is
involved. Id. at 107-08.
138. Attempts to limit standing in administrative law to those suffering direct legal restraint
have long since collapsed. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153-56 (1970); J. Vining, supra note 14, at 34-56 (1978).
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chanan decisively repudiate it: in each, the challenged prohibition imposed no
legal restraint upon the litigant; the core of the injury was to the litigant's
freedom to interact with a third person because of legal restrictions placed on
the third person. 39 Thus, it seems plain that either party to a regulated
transaction can challenge any limitation in first party terms, because for each
party the claim takes the following form: the state has advanced no sufficient
interest to justify prohibiting this interaction. 40
The constitutional protection accorded to the litigant necessarily entails
inquiry into the impact of the statute on third persons. Two general classes of
claims are possible: those in which a third party holds independent constitu-
tional rights or immunities that are threatened in a manner that impairs the
interaction (for example, speech or freedom from racial discrimination), and
those in which the only right jeopardized is the right to interact itself. A
comparison of a race-based zoning statute with one limiting occupancy to
residential uses illustrates the distinction. Although both statutes might pre-
vent a sale to a black for use as his law office, the buyer has a strong claim to
equal protection only regarding the former. The right to interact itself is, at
best, a weak liberty; and, in light of recent curtailments of the federal content
of "liberty," it may not be universally available. 14' Yet, when we turn to the
litigant's (here, the vendor's) first party claim to a right to interact, the
substantial resolving power of the concept is revealed-particularly where the
third party's (here, the vendee's) right is a potent one.
Even though the right to interact deserves only the most tolerant level of
scrutiny, the interference with it will not survive unless it serves a legitimate
governmental end. 42 The stronger the third party's right, the less the likeli-
139. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
140. The conventional view is that these cases involve third party, not first party, challenges.
E.g., 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 71, § 3531; cf. L. Tribe, supra note 4, at
103-09. The Court itself has been unclear about the situation and simply has mixed concepts of
first and third party standing. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 683-84
(1977). But as Carey and Craig v. Boren make plain, see supra text accompanying notes 72-74, the
Court seems to view these cases largely in third party terms, particularly in its discussions of the
merits. See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 n.13 (1976) (analyzing Pierce in third
party standing terms).
141. See infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
142. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). In Zobel, the Court invalidated an Alaska
statute that provided for payments to state residents differentiated in amount on the basis of
length of residence. The state attempted to justify the differential as a reward to citizens for their
"past contributions." Id. at 61 n.8. But, in finding the statute to be without a rational basis, the
Court held that the past-contributions objective was an illegitimate end. Id. at 63. This result was
reached over a dissent that contended that such a state objective was impermissible only in the
context of the right to travel-an analysis that the Court expressly eschewed. Id. at 82-83
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Zobel invites us to rethink some basic constitutional theory. Rational-
basis review had seemed particularly empty because, among other things, its requirement of a
legitimate state end was so undemanding. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 353 (1980). Indeed, like the dissenters in Zobel, I had thought that one of the principle
features of higher-tier scrutiny was that it ruled out as permissible ends some state goals that
would have been legitimate if only the rational-basis standard were implicated. Zobel disagrees;
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hood that the state can advance any legitimate independent justification for
regulating the interaction. Carey v. Population Services International43 is
instructive here. There a vendor challenged a statutory prohibition of the
distribution of contraceptives to persons over sixteen by anyone other than a
licensed pharmacist. The Court characterized the access limitation as a signifi-
cant and insufficiently justified burden on the constitutionally protected deci-
sion "whether or not to beget or bear a child.' 14 This broad definition of the
third persons' "privacy" rights 145 in turn deprived the state of any permissible
justification for barring the proposed interaction between them and the ven-
dor. 146 This was also the reasoning in Pierce. The Court's spacious definition
of a parental right to control the education of children undermined the state's
asserted justification for interfering with the school-family interaction. 47 In
general, it can be seen that the litigant's claim is dependent upon and symmet-
rical with the substantive reach of the third party rights. 48
3. The Limits of Interactive Liberty. - First party standing premised on
the right-to-interact approach embedded in Pierce, Truax, and Buchanan is
not boundless. The litigant's claim is a substantive one, and its disposition is a
disposition on the merits. In this section, I consider three matters bearing on
the substantive reach of the right to interact: (a) recent decisions narrowing
the "liberty" protected by due process; (b) the necessity and justification for
restricting right-to-interact challenges to cases involving "direct" governmen-
tal interference; and (c) the significance of the Court's recent emphasis on
''causation." The boundaries that these developments place on a liberty-based
standing analysis may be uncertain in some cases, and some lines suggested in
this section cannot be sharply drawn. Nonetheless, a principled theory that
reflects current substantive legal concepts is to be preferred over the unrea-
soned "discretion" that now dominates jus tertii standing.
the particular benefits of higher-tier review are simply the requirements that (a) the legitimate goal
be significant, i.e., compelling or substantial, and (b) any statutory classification satisfy the
constitutionally specified level of congruence between ends and means.
143. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
144. Id. at 685.
145. Id. at 685-89.
146. Id. at 690-91.
147. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36.
Even where the core of the third person's objection is that the state's interest, while "legiti-
mate," is not weighty enough, the litigant can still be seen as asserting that the interference with
his own rights is not "legitimate," see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), because the state
may not rest on a justification that is, for whatever reason, constitutionally invalid. One can, of
course, treat the weight and consequence requirements as subsets of the inquiry into the legitimacy
of state interests, but that seems to me to be something of a cheat; weight and consequence are
concepts distinct from the idea of a valid legislative goal.
148. Sedler, Substantive Jus Tertii, supra note 6, at 1333-34, apparently reaches a similar
conclusion, but through an approach that seems to me to lack analytic clarity. He argues that a
litigant may assert only his own rights, but provides no methodological specification for what




a. The Narrowing of Liberty. - The right-to-interact approach ad-
vanced here has its ground in the expansive conception of "liberty" interests
established by cases like Meyer v. Nebraska. 49 As is well known, the Court's
more recent decisions, most notably Board of Regents v. Roth, 50 Meachum v.
Fanno,'51 and Paul v. Davis,5 2 narrow the previously broad spectrum of
interests falling as a matter of federal constitutional law within that "liberty."
Roth held that a nontenured teacher lacked a general federally rooted liberty
interest in specific governmental employment, and Meachum, that when a
prisoner was validly committed to jail, his federally guaranteed liberty interest
was exhausted. Within their domain, these decisions would foreclose a right to
interact with the government. And, since the third party has no threshold
interest meriting constitutional protection against governmental invasion, it is
hard to see that anything is added by focusing on the potential loss to those
who would interact with him. 5 a Roth and Meachum are narrow in compass;
standing alone, they do not centrally threaten the broad aggregate of liberty
interests established by our constitutional tradition. They have no pertinence
to the whole area of private ordering, where private parties seek to interact
free of governmental interference. 54
149. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Of course, some constitutional claims may not implicate an
interactive right. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), for example, the defendant sought to
exclude evidence on the ground that an automobile search was unconstitutional, and that, as a
passenger, he had standing to object. After insisting that fourth amendment rights "are personal
rights, which like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted," id. at 133-
34, expressly denying third party standing, id. at 137-38, and concluding that standing and the
merits were "invariably interwined," id. at 139, the Court rejected the challenge on the merits, id.
at 138-39. Cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980) (defendant lacks standing to
suppress evidence seized from another person's brief case). See generally Adams & Nock, Search,
Seizure and Washington's Section 7: Standing from Salvucci to Simpson, 6 U. Puget Sound L.
Rev. 1, 1-30 (1982). For our purposes, however, what is important is that the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule has been justified only as a deterrent for police misconduct. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, supra note 26, at 2-10.
The exclusionary rule does not protect the right of the passenger to interact with its owner. Nor, I
would add, did the due process clause independently confer a right in these circumstances to
exclude the evidence, given the Court's view that exclusion of evidence is a judicially fashioned
remedy designed to deter police misconduct. See also Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S.
286, 289 (1968) (corporation cannot raise its president's privilege against self-incrimination). But
see Sedler, Constitutional Jus Tertii, supra note 6, at 1343.
150. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
151. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
152. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
153. Once the interests of either party to an interaction are declared to be a legal nullity,
claims arising from their interactive rights lose any legal force. This conclusion follows from
viewing interactive rights as reciprocal and essentially interdependent. A contrary view is not,
however, entirely implausible. Perhaps the interaction itself can be taken to have some legal
vitality independent of either party's separate claim. In that case, the liberty to interact alone
triggers due process rights even absent any other liberty interests.
154. See Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer, 1980, at 39, 47-49. Compare Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489-90 (1980) (transfer of
prisoner to mental hospital implicates liberty interest), with Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741,
1745 (1983) (transfer of prisoner to another state prison does not implicate liberty interests).
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The Court's 5-3 decision in Paul v. Davis is another matter altogether.
Paul held that, standing alone, state defamation of an individual did not
implicate the liberty or property protected by prodecural due process. What is
important here is the theory of the case. Broadly read, Paul denies eight
decades of history; it establishes that there is no general liberty secured by the
due process clause-that the federal content of liberty now includes only the
bill of rights, the right of privacy, freedom from bodily invasion, and freedom
of locomotion.' 5  Quite plainly, if this theory is extended outside the area of
procedural due process, it will undercut at least part of the analysis in this
paper. Even interactive standing linked to a third party's claim that equal
protection has been denied-a claim that would not require a preliminary
finding that the third party has a liberty or property interest-is vulnerable. 50
The litigant would lack any independent due process "liberty" interest, and
thus could not complain that the third party has been subject to an invalid
regulation.
Whether Paul will have such a revolutionary impact remains to be seen.
As yet, the Court seems reluctant to abandon a broad conception of both
substantive and procedural liberty where the claim is a right to be free from
governmental disabilities imposed on private conduct. 5 7 Even if full scope is
given to Paul's premises, a considerable part of the analysis advanced herein
could survive. Third party standing tied to federally grounded interests, such
as the bill of rights and privacy, would still be permitted to the extent such
rights engender corollary rights in the first party litigant. 58 Moreover, Paul
would protect as "liberty" rights to interact founded upon state law, if new
legal disabilities are imposed on previously recognized state law liberties. 50
b. "Direct" Interference. - Singleton v. Wulff60 permitted physicians
to raise the rights of their patients in challenging state refusals to pay for
certain abortions.' 6' We surely may assume that the restriction on payment
155. 424 U.S. at 710 n.5, discussed in Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," supra note
121, at 411, 424-25.
156. Such a sweeping curtailment of due process may well create considerable pressure to
allow the same claims to be reformulated in equal protection terms. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty"
and "Property," supra note 121, at 416-17. For example a vendor could assert that his own right
to equal protection is denied by the arbitrary classification in a statute forbidding sales to blacks.
Even though the vendor's injury is economic and thus warrants only minimal scrutiny, it is
doubtful that a purpose to discriminate against blacks could constitute a legitimate end. See Zobel
v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982) (discriminating against recent citizens not a legitimate end).
157. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 (1983) (state adequately protected
putative father's "inchoate interest in establishing a relationship" with his daughter).
158. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. For a similar view of equal protection
claims, see supra note 156.
159. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," supra note 121, at 425; see also Hewitt v.
Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864, 870-71 (1983) (federal protection for state created property interest);
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982) (same).
160. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
161. Id. at 112-18.
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discourages contact between physician and patient. Perhaps in an era of
affirmative government and one in which abortions are performed in clinics
where third party payments are a major source of funds, this should be viewed
as presenting a first party interactive claim. 162
Still, Wulff is not readily understood as a disguised first party claim. 16 3
The statute did not purport to regulate the interaction between the patient and
her physician. To characterize such an indirect impact on the physician-
patient relationship as within the Buchanan principle would make first party
standing virtually boundless: while other constitutional rights have boundaries
imposed by their language, interaction is the most pervasive of all human
activity. The cases from Pierce on down concern a narrower situation,
namely, where the state regulation has as its purpose a direct and meaningful
interference with or restriction on the interactive transaction. 6 4 Of course,
any formulation of a line in terms of direct-indirect categories is trouble-
some. 16 5 But here, as elsewhere, 66 some such division seems required, unless
one is prepared to develop first party standing doctrine well beyond that
supported by the Pierce line of decisions. 6 7
162. Such difficult cases are best resolved in actual litigation with full records. That difficult
cases exist does not necessarily impeach the validity of the distinction between direct and indirect
interferences with the liberty to interact. But if the general direct-indirect line is sound, denial of
third party standing to challenge indirect interferences can be justified as a way of maintaining
doctrinal coherence and stability.
163. Wulff is one of the few good examples of a genuine jus tertii case, and its correctness
depends on the limits on judicial authorization of private attorneys general. See infra notes 179-
203 and accompanying text. In light of the Court's current insistence on a special relationship
between the litigant and a third party, it is not surprising that most cases allowing third party
standing can be formulated in first party terms.
164. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 468 (1975) (regulation of lawyer-client relation-
ship); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) (regulation of landlord-tenant
relationship). But see United States v. Garrett, 521 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1975) (employer denied
standing to raise privacy rights of prostitutes he employed).
165. "[A] great principle of constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive statement
in an adjective." Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(objecting to a direct-indirect line in commerce clause cases).
166. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296, 2304-05 (1983) (distinguishing between
direct and indirect interferences with contractual obligations). See also the "indirect purchaser"
rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737 (1977), and its progeny.
167. On this analysis, a state statute suppressing gambling or any other business would
involve first party standing in a suit by the customer, as well as by the owner, but a statute
requiring that a business comply with labor or health codes would not, even if the result of
compliance would be to close down a particular business. It might be argued that such a line is
objectionable, not because of what it excludes, but in what it permits. Why should a customer be
able to complain in first party terms about shutting down a business, or for that matter any
restriction on its operation? Some case law looks askance at such standing. See, e.g., Davis &
Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1903); Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S.
304, 309 (1898). But the position taken in these decisions is hard to defend. Two different
considerations suggest themselves. First, it might be argued that the customer will be a second-
best plaintiff, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) (plurality opinion), one who is unlikely
"to assure that concrete adverseness which shapes the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
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Even assuming the general workability of a direct-indirect line, however,
what is its justification? That line might be plausible if third party standing
were conceived of only as a purely in-court litigation mechanism. But the
right-to-interact analysis advanced here posits a liberty interest that exists
outside of the courtroom; litigation simply vindicates that antecedent right.
When a litigant seeks to establish any other constitutional right, such as
speech or religion, the "indirectness" of the interference may have pertinence
to such issues as whether any material interference with the right has occurred,
and perhaps, to the level of justification required to sustain the interference.
But it has not been thought relevant to the preliminary question of whether
the litigant is asserting a right. Any material burden-direct or indirect-is
sufficient to trigger judicial inquiry. 68 Why, then, isn't the same analysis
followed with respect to the right to interact? Indirectness may have relevance
in ascertaining whether, on the merits, there has been a material interference
with the right. Why should it be otherwise pertinent to the litigant's ability to
present a first party challenge?
The argument has undeniable force. Whether it is ultimately persuasive is
another matter. The direct-indirect line is unappealing from the perspective of
a detached observer. From that vantage point, the effect-disruption of the
interaction-is the same, whatever its origin. But the law's focus has generally
been narrower: its concern has been with the person as he is situated in a social
186, 204 (1962). While not without force, a generalized bar based upon fear of this nature seems
unsupportable. See Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 438 n.74. Moreover, it has long been clear that
should any litigant fail to present the facts or law so as to provide a satifactory record for
constitutional adjudication, his suit can be dismissed on ripeness (not standing) grounds.
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 10, at 1371-73.
A second objection to permitting the customer to complain about regulation of a business is
that the possessor of the right-the regulated business-may not wish to assert it. Wuilff, 428 U.S.
at 113-14 (plurality opinion). It is doubtful that this objection should be valued. See Rohr, supra
note 6, at 405; see also Director v. Perini North River Assocs., 103 S. Ct. 634, 640-41 (1983)
(labor department official has standing to seek review of administrative ruling concerning injured
employee). But see Rohr, supra note 6, at 458-59. The objection ignores the fact that the customer
is asserting a distinct first party claim of his own: the opportunity to persuade others to interact
with him. L. Tribe, supra note 4, at 96. To be sure, the business remains free to ignore the
litigant's victory and proceed in voluntary compliance with the statute. Thus the real barrier here
is likely to be Warth's insistence that the litigant demonstrate reasonable probability that he will
benefit from a judgment on the merits. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975). Perhaps it
should be presumed that identifiable businesses will willingly comply, and thus the causation
doctrine should bar customer standing. But to my eye such a general presumption is unwarranted.
In a competitive market, gratuitous compliance with a regulation that entails additional costs
after the regulation has been held invalid would be the exception. Accordingly, unless it is clear ex
ante that the business will voluntarily comply with the challenged statute, the customer-litigant
should be held to satisfy the threshold causation requirement.
Where the litigant and third party both would have "first party" standing, their common
injury is likely to result in alignment of their interests against the challenged rule. Thus both the
schools and pupils in Pierce and the vendor and male vendees in Craig plainly had first party
standing and parallel objections. Cf. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1976) (son's opposi-
tion to mother's challenging his execution defeated mother's standing); Rohr, supra note 6, at
457.
168. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156,
1251-55 (1980) (distinguishing between direct and substantial interferences).
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context. From this perspective, it seems plausible to focus on the litigant's
reasonable expectations outside the courtroom context. 16 9 He is likely to
experience some conduct as an "interference" with his freedom to interact,
and some as not. Thus, a statute barring physicians from performing abor-
tions would be experienced as a direct interference with the patient's right to
interact; a statute requiring all physicians to have indemnity insurance or
special training would not. Similarly, statutes prohibiting all teachers from
giving instruction in German would pass the directness requirerfient; statutes
governing the dismissal of individual teachers for moral turpitude would not,
even if in a particular instance it had the effect of removing the only available
German teacher. A direct-indirect line seems a workable, albeit by no means a
perfect, approximation of this distinction in perception, and a line of that
nature seems to be implicit in the tort law's allowance of claims for interfer-
ence with advantageous relationships. 70 It also seems implicit in the case law,
which permits jus tertii standing so long as a sufficient "relationship" exists
between the litigant and an identifiable third party right holder.' 7' The rela-
tionship requirement both antedates and is apparently not thought to be
reducible to the Court's current insistence that the litigant show that he is
likely to benefit from any judgment. 72
There is another reason for limiting the right to interact to cases of direct
interference: article III. Warth v. Seldin173 indicates that a generalized right-
169. I recognize the danger here that I am not "describing" anything, but instead imposing
my own normative concepts under the label of "description." That is a constant problem, as the
Court's fourth amendment "no reasonable expectation of privacy" cases show. See, e.g., Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).
170. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 129 (4th ed. 1972); Note, An Analysis of the Formation
of Property Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other Economic Rela-
tions, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1116, 1117-18 (1983).
171. Sedler, Constitutional Jus Tertii, supra note 6, at 633-45; Rohr, supra note 6, at 437-
42. The relationship concept is, however, by no means problem-free. What counts as such a
relationship now raises difficulties. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) ("advocate"
of third party rights has standing); Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 441. Both the Court and
commentators proceed on a largely intuitive basis, drawing upon normal patterns of social
interaction, and being troubled by standing in cases of "unusual" relationships. See, e.g.,
Cheaney v. Indiana, 410 U.S. 991 (1973) (nonphysician who performed abortion cound not raise
claims of patient); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (mother did not have "next friend"
standing to challenge execution of son who had knowingly and intelligently waived right to appeal
and who objected to mother's challenge); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975) (residents
could not raise rights of excluded low-income groups).
172. See infra text accompanying notes 177-178. In Singleton v. Wulff, for example, the
physician would have benefited monetarily-or so we may presume-if he or she had been
successful in invalidating the restrictions on reimbursement for abortions. It is at least plausible
that Wulff presents a clearer case of judicially redressable injury in fact than that involved in an
effort by physicians to challenge a statute concerning state wardship for live-born infants.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 n.2 (1976). The Court has consistently refused
to permit third party challenges to litigants who suffer no injury in fact. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-
76 (1982); Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 429-30.
173. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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to-interact claim would not satisfy current understandings of the injury-in-fact
requirement. The Court there expressed doubt that a generalized challenge to
an exclusionary zoning ordinance could be maintained by local residents on a
right-to-interact theory, 17 4 at least absent congressional sanction. 75 These
doubts were reinforced when the Court denied standing to residents in part of
a city to challenge illegal racial practices elsewhere in the city. 17 Whether these
doubts are well placed is not material here. The crucial point is that they
suggest a need to accommodate a right to interact with the injury-in-fact
requirement. This, in turn, makes plausible the limitation of interaction chal-
lenges to those that constitute a material and direct interference with the right
to interact.
c. Causation. - Even if a liberty to interact exists, a first party challenge
may fail because there is no reasonable likelihood that a favorable judgment
will promote interaction. Thus the Court's recent emphasis on the "causa-
tion" requirement-that a litigant demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that he
will benefit from a favorable judgment' 77-could stand as an important bar-
rier to first party claims based on a substantive right to interact. The causation
requirement obviously permits the screening out of farfetched interactive
claims. But I see no reason in principle why it should be erected into a
formidable barrier, one that bars substantial right-to-interact standing chal-
lenges. 7 8 Thus, I see no reason why interactive claims should be limited to
situations, as in Buchanan, where a valid contract exists. The case law evinces
a more generous standard: so long as there is a reasonably plausible interactive
claim, the causation requirement should be deemed satisfied, at least prima
facie.
IV. Jus TERTII AND THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
In this Part, I want to proceed on the premise that a genuine jus tertii
claim is involved-one that cannot properly be formulated in first party
174. Id. at 514 (dealing with the claims of local residents complaining of the effects of
exclusionary zoning practices). It is, however, important to note that the court did not rule on the
propriety of an interactive-right-based claim, since the local residents had not argued that they
had been denied any constitutional rights.
175. The Court, id. at 513-14, reaffirmed the authority of Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972), recognizing Congress's power to confer such a right. This
means that the "interaction" interest is not too thin to satisfy article Ill. On the question of
whether Congress has power to confer standing, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 63 (Supp.
1981).
176. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-79 (1982); see also LeBel, Stand-
ing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Framework for Analysis, 1982 Duke L.J.
1013.
177. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-46 (1976); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-08 (1975); Common Cause v. Department of Energy, 702 F.2d 245,
250-51 (4th Cir. 1983). See generally Varat, Variable Justiciability and the Duke Power Case, 58
Tex. L. Rev. 273 (1980). For a brief but lucid account, see L. Tribe, supra note 4, at 92-97.
178. Some situations, see Rohr, supra note 6, at 258, may, however, strongly suggest that
plaintiffs would not benefit by a judgment. See supra note 167.
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terms. This premise can rest on a rejection of the right-to-interact approach
previously outlined, as well as on a view that some appropriate third party
standing cases in any event cannot fairly be understood in right-to-interact
terms. To the extent that genuine jus tertii standing is involved, what can be
said about its character?
We might begin by asking why the Court insists upon a "relationship"
between the litigant and the third party as a condition to permitting the
litigant to raise the rights of third parties. 7 9 Of course, some relationships
evidence the presence of interactive rights or buttress the claim that interfer-
ence with such rights is direct-but these are concerns of first party stand-
ing. 180 The existence of a relationship does not seem relevant to genuine jus
tertii standing per se.
Indeed, in many other analogous contexts, no special relationship is felt
to be necessary. The range of situations in which a litigant might be thought to
be raising challenges not implicating his own rights is far wider than that
embodied in the jus tertii case law. The competitor-standing cases from
administrative law are illuminating. Following the tendency to assimilate
public law to private law, the Court at first declined to recognize standing,
since a competitor had no common law right to be free from competition. 181
As the need for adequate judicial control of administrative conduct became
more insistently felt, this conception was replaced by one in which the compet-
itor was increasingly seen as a "private attorney general.' 81 2 Still later the
competitor was seen as asserting an interest (competition) within the zone of
statutory protection,8 3 but the private attorney general flavor remained. The
179. The most elaborate explication of this requirement is stated in the plurality opinion in
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-16 (1976):
[T]he Court has looked primarily to two factual elements to determine whether the [third
party standing] rule should apply in a particular case. The first is the relationship of the
litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert. If the enjoyment of the right is
inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least
can be sure its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that the right's
enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the suit. Furthermore, the relationship
between the litigant and the third party may be such that the former is fully, or very
nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the latter ....
The other factual element to which the Court has looked is the ability of the third
party to assert his own right .... If there is some genuine obstacle to such assertion ...
the third party's absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is not
truly at stake, or truly important to him, and the party who is in court becomes by
default the right's best available proponent.
But see Rohr, supra note 6, at 404-16 (criticizing Wulfj); supra note 167 (same).
180. See supra notes 132-48, 171 and accompanying text.
181. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 139-41 (1939).
182. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940) (competi-
tion vindicates the public interest); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). See generally L. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 505-31.
183. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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competitor's standing was not premised on a "right" to be free from competi-
tion, but on the quite different proposition that competitive impact was an
"interest" that the regulatory body must take into account. 84 Moreover, the
competitor's standing included the right to challenge aspects of the agency
decision unrelated to its competitive impact. 8 5 Consider also the problem of
class actions; a litigant is permitted to press for relief for his entire class, not
just for himself, even though class-wide relief is not necessary to give him full
relief. 8
6
Challenges based upon the allocation of powers between the Nation and
the states and among the branches of the national government provide other
illustrations. The argument that a state law is preempted by either a federal
statute or by the grants of unexercised authority to the national government
can often be understood as permitting a private litigant to assert the institu-
tional claims of the national government. 8 7 So too can many claims that
federal statutes violate separation of powers, or exceed the federalism limits
imposed on the national government. 8 8 Even if the litigant has "standing" to
raise these claims because his "interests" are implicated, many of these struc-
tural challenges have been thought by some commentators not to involve the
litigant's "rights" in any straightforward sense. 8"
The foregoing illustrations are all problematic, of course. Perhaps they
can all be assimilated within a first party standing framework. For example,
preemption cases may be thought to involve the litigant's own right to be
regulated in accordance with a valid rule,19 0 particularly given the Court's
184. See L. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 508; Sunstein, supra note 10, at 759.
185. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667, 1732-33 (1975). For a briefer treatment, see L. Tribe, supra note 4, at 109-10. These
dramatic changes are, in my view, not accounted for simply by referring to differences in
statutory language. See J. Vining, supra note 14, ch. 3.
186. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). Rohr rightly
argues that these suits involve jus tertii claims. Rohr, supra note 6, at 444-54. This point has
special force where it can be said confidently that adequate and full relief for the litigant is not
dependent upon granting relief for the class.
187. The labor preemption cases are particularly illuminating in this respect. The jus tertil
character of preemption seems most plausible when preemption is based upon the "arguably-
protected, arguably-prohibited" rationale of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 244-47 (1959). Where preemption rests on a premise that federal law mandates that
state law yield to the results of private ordering, the individual rights approach is more plausible.
Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), is an example of a litigant asserting his own rights. For a recent
discussion of these two different kinds of labor preemption, see Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 103 S. Ct.
3172 (1983).
188. See, e.g., Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection,
27 Stan. L. Rev. 603 (1975) (distinguishing between federalism and individual right objections).
189. See J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional
Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 195-205, 241-58, 263-72 (1980) (emphasizing
that in many cases the litigant's right can be denied if the proper organ of government chooses to
do so).
190. In Rice v. Rehner, 103 S. Ct. 3291 (1983), for example, a vendor, a federally licensed
Indian trader, was permitted to challenge a state liquor statute on the ground that it interfered
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conclusion that section 1983 gives a right of action for most state interferences
with federal statutory and constitutional claims. 9' Moreover, the historical
insight that the actual allocation of political power affects the dynamics of a
system of civil liberties has contemporary relevance. 192 Still, these illustrations
at least suggest that much existing law is in fact closely akin to third party
standing. Recognition of that fact gives added force to the question of why in
jus tertii cases we insist upon the existence of a relationship between the
litigant and the third party.9 3
To my eye, the familiar "relationship requirement," whatever its justifi-
cations, obscures the fact that on the Court's premises recognition of jus tertii
standing translates into judicial licensing of private attorneys general. Like
any private attorney general, the litigant vindicates the public interest in
bringing about compliance (here by public officials) with controlling public
norms. Moreover, again like other private attorneys general, the litigant
advances the concrete interests of identifiable third persons, or classes
thereof.9 4
Congress could authorize private attorneys general under its article I
powers, as well as under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War amend-
ments. 1 5 But what is the source of judicial authority to license such suits on
with tribal sovereignty protected by federal law. It is easy to think of such a challenge as one
raising the "rights" of third parties, and surely Congress could restrict such claims to the tribe
itself. But the case fits squarely within the Pierce-Truax-Buchanan mold.
191. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). On the limits of the holding, see Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). See also Sunstein,
Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394 (1982).
192. Monaghan, Book Review, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 296, 308-09 (1980). INS v. Chadha, 103 S.
Ct. 2764 (1983), affords a good example of the tight connection between separation of powers and
individual rights. See generally Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, supra note 10.
193. In Duke Power, the Court quite correctly perceived that, in principle, cases recognizing
third party standing are inconsistent with the suggestion that a connection between the injury and
the specific right asserted by the litigant is constitutionally required. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978) (permitting a takings challenge to liability limits
for nuclear accidents on the basis of environmental injury that would result from the construction
and operation of a nuclear plant). The previous discussion suggests that the jus tertii cases do not
stand alone in that regard. Professor Tribe seems to me entirely correct in viewing the general
nexus requirement as simply another way of preventing third party standing. L. Tribe, supra note
4, at 100-01. Contra Rohr, supra note 6, at 441-42.
194. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). See generally Coffee,
Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215 (1983). Indeed in jus tertii challenges the litigant frequently
advances the interests of a large number of vendees. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (interests of potential customers of distributor of contraceptives).
195. The Court, of course, continues to insist that Congress must limit its authorizing of
litigants to entities suffering injury in fact. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). But it shows no real
disposition to check congressional determinations that such injury exists. E.g., Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979). I have argued that the injury-in-fact requirement is not a limitation on Congress.
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 10, at 1375-79. But see Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 5, at 63 (Supp. 1981).
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the Court's own motion? Such authority does not seem to me derivable as an
incident of the remedial powers inherent in the grant of equity and declaratory
jurisdiction. 96 Moreover, such a basis, even if it existed, would not support
application to the states of the rules regarding third party private attorney
general standing. Some adequate source for the creation of private attorneys
general must, therefore, be located.
That the Constitution itself could be read to generate some genuine jus
tertii actions I do not doubt, given my belief that the substantive constitu-
tional guarantees have important remedial consequences. 1 7 Indeed, the Con-
stitution itself, not notions of judicial discretion, may be the source of the
private attorneys general warrants in Barrows and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson-where the effect of the judicial proceeding itself would be to
destroy the rights of the third person. 198 But recognition of jus tertii standing
as a constitutional imperative outside that limited framework seems to me far
more problematic. Any such judicial power seems deeply inconsistent with the
private rights model of Tyler and Yazoo. And while such judicial power may
be more congruent with the root assumptions of the public action theory, the
justificatory link has yet to be made, particularly in terms of the federalism
interests of the state courts in structuring their own remedial frameworks.
Perhaps the Court has authority to license additional private attorneys
general as a matter of constitutional common law, a theory of judicial law-
making that seems reconcilable with both contending paradigms of constitu-
tional adjudication. That theory posits judicial power to create a substructure
of constitutionally inspired, but not constitutionally required, rules designed
to implement constitutional guaranties. 9 No other theory seems to me to
196. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 572-73 & nn.40-41 (1947) (discre-
tionary component of equitable and declaratory remedial doctrine is often exercised to avoid
unnecessary constitutional adjudication even when the Court has jurisdiction).
197. See supra note 26.
198. See supra notes 26, 60-65, 100-02, 126 and accompanying text.
199. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
supra note 26. The theory seems to be responsive to the concerns of this Article. It recognizes that
the source of the Supreme Court's authority to insist that the state courts follow any rule not
required by the Constitution or authorized by some federal statute is not evident. As Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), makes plain, there is no general federal judicial power to displace
state law. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1682
(1974). To the contrary, the courts must point to some authoritative source, such as a statute, as
explicitly or implicitly authorizing judicial creation of substantive federal law. E.g., DelCostello
v. International Bhd. Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2887 n.13 (1983). But there is no a priori reason
to suppose that the Constitution itself should differ from statutes in providing a basis for the
generation of an interstitial federal common law. Not surprisingly, therefore, a significant body
of federal common law has been developed on the basis of constitutional provisions and the
constitutional structure in areas where state interests are ultimately subordinated to interests of
special concern to the national government within the reach of the plenary national legislative
power. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
supra note 26, at 10-17.
The principle of these "federalism" cases does not by itself establish that the Court may
fashion a common law based solely upon constitutional provisions framed as limitations on
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account for the exclusionary rule cases, so long as the Court persists in its view
that the introduction of the illegally seized evidence is not a separate violation
of the defendant's fourth amendment rights, or a necessary remedy there-
for.2 0 On the Court's view, the defendant seems to be a private attorney
general asserting the public (a third party) interest in confining police conduct
within constitutional limits. But it is, I recognize, an open question whether,
under our constitutional framework, the Court can be viewed as possessing
authority to fashion a common law of civil liberties. 20 1 Moreover, special
difficulties are present here. In suits by private attorneys general, a public
attorney general exists. But it seems doubtful that without statutory authority
the executive could institute a suit to vindicate fourteenth amendment
rights.202 Perhaps, however, given the long historical sanction of private
enforcement of public norms, and the general conception that virtually all
domestic executive power depends upon statutory authorization, this fact may
not count much against an otherwise justified limited recognition of the
private attorney general. 203
governmental power in order to vindicate civil liberties, such as the first and fourth amendments.
Such a judicial rulemaking authority raises federalism issues of a different order, as well as
separation-of-powers considerations at the national level. Id. at 34-40. Nonetheless, the Court's
constitutionally based common law decisions in areas of plenary national legislative authority at
least invite inquiry into whether the specific constitutional guaranties of individual liberty might
also authorize the creation of a substructure of judicially fashioned rules to carry out the purposes
and policies of those guaranties, while at the same time recognizing a coordinate and controlling
authority in Congress. There has, however, been no significant judicial consideration of this
theory apart from the en banc decision in Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated
sub nom. City of W. Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974, on remand, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (availability of § 1983 action against municipality precludes judicial creation of analogous
remedy relying directly on fourteenth amendment).
200. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
supra note 26, at 2-10.
201. Id. Whatever its perceived advantages, a theory that posits a judicial competence to
fashion a constitutionally inspired common law of civil liberties, see id., must deal adequately
with additional objections: development of such a body of law is inconsistent with the original
intent of the framers; the line between true constitutional interpretation and constitutional
common law is too indeterminate to be useful; the existence of such judicial power is inconsistent
with the autonomy of the executive department in enforcing law as well as the rightful indepen-
dence of the states in the federal system. See Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional
Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117 (1978). The theory of constitutional common law bears a
family resemblance to the views of those commentators who hold that the Court may legitimately
engage in noninterpretive review-that is, the Court may properly impose values on the political
branches not fairly inferrable from the constitutional text or the structure it creates-but who
insist that Congress may control those decisions by regulating the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. E.g., M. Perry, The Constitution, The Courts and Human Rights (1982); L. Lusky, By
What Right? (1975). Other differences aside, the constitutional common law view permits Con-
gress to overrule the noninterpretive decisions directly, thereby bypassing the awkward theoretical
and political problems associated with congressional attempts to manipulate jurisdiction for
substantive ends.
202. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 199-201 (3d Cir. 1980).
203. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 n.16 (1972) (stressing historic preference
for private enforcement of law). I assume, of course, that any private attorney general licensed by
the Court will have suffered cognizable injury in fact.
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CONCLUSION
Third party standing doctrine has developed largely without examination
of the fundamental issues that such standing implicates. The Court's invoca-
tion of prudential or discretionary limits, with a wavering overlay of special
exceptions, obscures troublesome questions deserving of closer attention. To
some extent third party standing cases reflect a larger movement from a
private to a public action model of adjudication. But until the terms of such a
model are more clearly articulated and are embraced by the courts, it is
important to understand the sources of and limits on judicial power to control
the issues a litigant may raise. Given the range of circumstances in which third
party standing claims arise, it is not surprising that a monolithic approach is
unsatisfactory. For example, the implications for federal-state relations when
the Supreme Court reviews state court rulings premised on third party stand-
ing differ depending on whether state law permits such standing. More gener-
ally, some third party standing cases are best understood in first party terms.
This seems so at least for overbreadth cases and jus tertii cases that can be
grounded on a due process liberty to interact with the third party right holder.
That standing in these cases rests on a federal right implies that state courts
are not free to ignore the claim and that prudential concerns are out of place
in federal courts. More troublesome are cases not properly reducible to first
party analysis. Here traditional limits on the use of private attorneys general
suggest that, absent congressional sanction or necessary implication from the
Constitution, jus tertii standing is problematic. Whether or not any of the
particular suggestions offered here are ultimately persuasive, we must begin to
articulate the unspoken premises of third party standing.
